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I. THE MAZE OF ECONOMIC CHANGES AND A CLUE
The preceding chapters form a moving picture of the economic
changes now going on in the United States.They show scenes from
real life registered from various angles by a group of skilled observers.
Starting with a survey of the kinds and quantities of goods American
families are consuming, the scene shifts to the work people are doing in
factories and mines, on construction jobs, railways, ships and farms.
Another shift focuses attention upon the activities of labor organizations
and of management.Then come the impersonal records of price fluctua-
tions, capital accumulations, banking and international dealings.The
close links into the beginning—it shows the inflow of incomes which
enable American families to sustain their varied consumption.
This record presents striking contrasts.Consumption as a whole
has increased, but the consumption of certain great staples has shrunk.
While trade at large has flourished, certain branches have languished—
notably ship building, the railway equipment industry, and• agriculture;
in less measure the textile, coal and shoe trades.Pay-roll disbursements
of factories have expanded, but manufacturing employment has dimin-
ished.Business profits have been large, but so also have been the
number of bankruptcies.Great quantities of gold have flowed into the
country, but wholesale prices have sagged much of the time.Income
as a whole has grown larger, but important sections of the country have
made little gain, and important occupations have suffered loss.
Impressionistic writers often disregard such diversities of fortune.
One can paint a glowing picture of American prosperity which empha-
sizes the triumphs of mass production in automatic factories, the success
of large-scale farming with power machinery, the rapid spread of chain
stores, the co-operation of labor unions in enlarging output, the economy
of high wages, our new position in international finance.Or one can
paint a picture of average and subaverage performance by ordinary
men struggling with difficult circumstances and ending in discourage-
ment or failure.Both pictures may be true to life, so far as they go.
Both are easy to make—one has only to select from the abundant
materials those which harmonize with the chosen theme.Both are
easy to understand because they show no incompatible elements.But
neither picture satisfies an observer who uses his eyes.
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A just picture is neither easy to make nor easy to understand after it
has been made.Trustworthy general impressions must be based upon
study of what is happening in different geographical sections, in different
industries, business enterprises, labor organizations, markets, professional
societies, trade associations, and Government bureaus.No individual,
is equipped to gather and to analyze all of the evidence which should be
canvassed.For that there is needed the critical skill of engineers,
business executives, public officials, bankers, economists, statisticians,
labor specialists and agricultural experts.Even in his own department,
each of these men finds diverse developments.Often there is a striking
contrast between average current performance and exceptional achieve-
ments which are important more for what they promise in the future than
for what they represent in the present.At times, national totals or
averages can be drawn up to summarize the general situation as seen from
some angle; but the very estimators who present such figures emphasize
the differences hidden in the general results.And when the contribu-
tions of numerous specialists have been assembled in one volume, there
still remains the task of assimilating all the elements—of understanding
the picture as a whole.'
The best clue to the maze of recent economic changes, is supplied by.
economic history.What has been happening in the United States is the
latest phase of cumulative processes which have dominated western
life since the Industrial Revolution got under way.Powerful as these
processes are, they were appreciably influenced by the sudden outbreak
of the warand by the sudden return of peace.By changing the condi-
tions amidst which the old influences worked, these world shocks con-
tributed to strange results.
II. THE CONTINUING FORCES—SCIENCE AND ECONOMIC CHANGE
The nineteenth century brought an unprecedented increase in the
number of Europeans, an unprecedented spread of Europeans over the
1Notthat all factors which have affected the economic fortunes of the United
States in recent years are adequately presented in the survey. We have had to shape
our inquiries according to our means.Little is said about the enormous advantages
which this country, in sharp àontrast to Europe, enjoys from the absence of internal
tariff barriers, or about the mixed effects of the tariff upon imports.The influence
of federal, state and local taxation is mentioned here and there; but it is not syste-
matically discussed.Previous inquiries had shown how difficult it would be to get
conclusive data concerning the economic reactions of the Eighteenth Amendment;
with the limited time and money at our disposal it seemed futile to scratch the skin.
of that controverted issue.Immigration restriction is dealt with incidentally; it
merits far closer analysis than we have been able to provide.But even with these
omissions and others of less moment, we have a rather bewildering array of factors'
to set in order.A REVIEW 843
earth, and. marked changes in their relation to other peoples.These
multiplying numbers, moreover, gradually attained a higher level of
material comfort than the mass of their, progenitors had ever enjoyed.
These great changes in the fortunes of mankind were made possible
by the. application of science to the work of producing, transporting,
manufacturing, and distributing goods.Increasingly, wide and exact
knowledge of natural processes underlay the invention of the steam
engine, the locomotive, the, steamship; the smelting of iron with coal;
the improvements in mining and metallurgy; the development of the
telegraph, ocean cable, telephone, dynamo, transmission line, radio; the
industrial applications of chemistry and biology, the increasing precision
of work, the system of interchangeable parts, the progress toward auto-
matic mechanisms, the linking of machines into continuous processes
for mass production; the rise of the oil and rubber industries; the per-
fecting of the internal combustion engine, the automobile and the
airplane. .
- Inthe course of the century, a technique of material progress was
developed.Science spread from its ancient stronghold of mathematics
into a systematic study of the most. varied phenomena, including the
phenomena of living processes and consciousness.The industrial, appli-
cation of scientific discoveries was secured by the rise and differentiation
of the engineering professions.From, the 'parent stock of military:
engineers there developed in turn civil engineers, mechanical, mining,
marine, sanitary, gas, chemical, electrical,., efficiency and production
engineers—each group trained in the fundamental sciences, and experi-
enced in industrial practice.Business men were prompt to see the profit
which could be drawn from the use of the new methods. ,Indeed,the
Industrial Revolution had been preceded by a Commercial Revolution.
2Prof.Walter F. Wilicox has kindly supplied the following estimates of the popu-
lation of the world in millions of persons.He t,hinks that his figure for the number of
Europeans outside of Europe in .1900 is probably too low.
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Encouraged by the gradual expansion of demand, business leaders had
been reorganizing methods of prqducing, transporting and distributing
goods to secure greater efficiency.But this quiet process was enor-
mously stimulated by the "great inventions" and the numberless inven-
tions which followed.For these technical improvements not only
increased efficiency more than mere reorganization of old processes
could do; they also widened the markets at surprising speed and thus
created ever larger opportunities for the business organizer to seize.
Not only did the new technique enable men to produce more from
their known resources, it also brought distant resources within reach and
discovered new treasures which were turned to human use.Vast new
granaries were developed in the Mississippi Valley, Argentina and
Canada; vast new ranges for cattle and sheep stretched from Texas to
Montana and over much of Argentina and Australia.The textile mills
of England were fed cotton from the South Atlantic and Gulf States,
Egypt and India; silk from China and Japan; wool from Argentina and
Australia; coarser fibers from Mexico and the Philippines.European
soils were replenished from Chilean nitrates.liron ranges of great
extent were found in North America; copper came from Michigan,
Montana, Arizona, Utah, Chile and Peru; gold flowed from Brazil,
California, Australia, Alaska and South Africa; petroleum pools were
found dotted over the globe.Most important of all for the new tech-
nique, coal deposits, surpassing those of England in extent, were developed
in Europe and America.Science enabled the generations which applied
it to tap energy from the sun, accumulated through millions of years.
As research, engineering and business enterprise were developed, so
also was prospecting.The world was combed over as never before by
men with piercing eyes and long plans.
By. no means all the increase in efficiency took the form of a net
gain in current livelihood.To use the technique founded on science,
men had to build machines, factories, railways, roads, warehouses and
sewers.In developing new resources, they had to dig mines; to break
the prairies and fence in farms; to make homes in strange habitats.And
this work of re-equipping themselves for making consumers' goods was
never done.Every discovery put to use on a commercial scale meant a
new equipment job, often of great extent.But after all this work on
the means of production was done, there remained an ever larger flow
of the things men eat and wear, house and amuse themselves with..
The net gain in ability to provide for their desires brought men the
possibility of raising their standard of consumption, of reducing their
hours of work, of giving their children more education, of increasing
their numbers.They took a slice of each of these. goods, rather than
all of one.They worked somewhat less hard as the decades went by;
they raised their standards of consumption appreciably; they establishedA REVIEW 845
compulsory education and reduced illiteracy; they added to the popu-
lation.Any one of these changes might have been made on a larger
scale had not men taken their gains in various forms.
The pace at which the sciences grow, and the pace at which their
discoveries are applied to the work of the world, keep changing.In any
given field of scientific discovery or commercial application, a period of
revolutionary changes is followed by rapid expansion as the new discovery.
is fitted into the existing body of knowledge or the existing structure of
industry; then expansion tends to slow down.One after another, many
of our leading industries have gone through this cycle of changes since
1800.In any given in any given country, some parts of its
economic mechanism were being made over, some parts were growing
steadily, some parts were changing little.Hence the growth of industry
as a whole has been less unsteady than the growth of its component
parts.The pace has not been uniform, however; even from the national
viewpoint there have been periods of more rapid andlessrapid
advance.
Population growth also has its changes of. pace.The nations which
lead in science and industry have been increasing their numbers more
slowly of late than in the earlier part of the nineteenth century.This
change is explained by experts as so rriany modern changes are explained—
it is attributed in large part to the practical application of scientific
knowledge.From a critical study of European evidence, Sir William
Beveridge concludes: "The practice of birth control, that is to say, the
deliberate prevention of fertilization, suddenly increased about 1880, not
because there was then any change of economic conditions making
restriction of families suddenly more desirable than before, but because
the means of birth control were perfected and the knowledge of them
was spread, both by those interested in their sale and by disinterested
propagandists."3That may not be all of the story, but, wha.tever its
causes, the reduction of the birth rate meant that as men acquired more
knowledge they absorbed a smaller share of the gains from applied science
in propagating their kind, and thereby increased the possibility of
shortening hours and of raising the standard of living.
The whole process of gaining .new knowledge and putting it to use
has. had to make headway against Other human interests—particularly
man's interest in getting the better of his fellowmen.Business friction,
class struggles, and national wars check science and the peaceful arts;
they impoverish the participants and usually injure the bystanders as
well. .
"The Fall of Fertility among European Races," Economica, March, 1925,. No.
13, p. 20. . . .846 RECENT ECONOMIC CHANGES
III. THE WAR AND ECONOMIC CHANGES
Of the checks which economic progress has suffered since the Indus-
trial Revolution began, the gravest was inflicted by the war of 1914—1918.
For all the great nations which lead in science and industry were directly
involved in this desperate struggle, and all the lesser nations on the
same cultural plane were,either belligerents or harassed neighbors of the
belligerents.Never had warring powers mobilized their brains and
brawn, their industrial equipment, and their financial resources so
skillfully to harm the persons and property of their enemies.Of the
damages inflicted and suffered, we need here note only such items as
help to account for the postwar changes in American conditions and
practices.
The elaborate equipment for attack and defense demanded by up-to-
date standards of military efficiency meant that every soldier at the
front had to be served by several workers behind the lines.In desperate
haste, each belligerent organized its industry and trade to produce a
maximum output of military supplies and the indispensable minimum of
goods for civilians.A large part of the most efficient workers had to
be withdrawn from production and others hurriedly trained to' take their
places.Old factories had to be remodeled for war uses and new plants
built that would serve 'no peace-time purpose.Governments had to
intervene on a grand scale in operatiOns where private initiative had
been deemed more effective.Long-run advantages and deliberate
planning had to be sacrificed 'to immediate needs.Despite prodigies
of energy on the part of many leaders and devotion on the part of the
masses, the industrial changes of the war were attended by enormous
wastes, in addition to the wastes which the reorganization was intended
to effect.
In finance the war brought even wilder confusion than in industry.
Monetary and banking policies were dictated, not by the economic
interests of peoples, but, by the pressure of circumstances.Specie
payments were suspended in several countries almost immediately.
Wholesale prices, wages, and costs of living, in terms of the irredeemable
paper currencies, underwent fantastic fluctuations, and made necessary
awkward schemes of government control.Millions of people had much
of their property quietly confiscated through no fault of their own, and
thousands grew suddenly rich not by virtue of service.Taxes mounted
to heights which seemed unbearable, but public debts swelled faster
still.No rule of, rational finance could be followed when it ran counter
to the plea Of necessity.
The latest estimates indicate that "the w,ar carried off in round num-
bers thirteen million mobilized The war is charged further with
a large share of responsibility for the ten million deaths during the
influenza epidemic of 1918, and the scarcely less destructive epidemicsA REVIEW 847
which followed in I astern Europe.Census figures shc1w that the total
population of Europe declined more than ten millions between 1910 and
19.20.The loss from. 1917 to 1920 must have been considerably greater.4
Thus the war left Europe with fewer people; these people were less
well-nourished, less able-bodied, less self-reliant; their industrial equip-
ment was in poor physical condition and, in good part useless for peace-
time production; their soils .were depleted from the lack of fertilizers;
they had sacrificed a large part of. their farm animals; they had laid
waste considerable stretches .ofland and ruined many towns.When
peace returned, they faced the task of demobilizing their soldiers and
war workers, releasing their government controls, reorganizing their
industrial forces, and restoring their capital equipment while prices were
still fluctuating violently, and while political prospects, domestic and
international, were most uncertain..Economic welfare in Europe had
received a setback indeed.
The economic position of the United States improved greatly in
comparison with Europe's during the war.But that was more because
European losses were staggering than because American gains werq
spectacular.
Business in this country recovered from depression in the second half
of 1915 with remarkable rapidity, thanks largely to war orders.Then
we had a year of intense business prosperity in 1916, followed in 1917—18
by the heetic economic activity which prevailed among all the belligerents.
If taxes were heavy, current profits were very large.Nor were the gains
confined to the profit-making classes.Wage rates may not have kept
even pace with the cost of living, but employment was full and there
was a widespread reduction in standard working time' between 1914 and
1920, which Dr. Leo Wolman estimates at, five hours a week.
Listing the deductions is a more complicated matter.There was an
uncommonly large share of haste and waste, as well as of profits, in war-
contract work during 1915 and 1916.Though we were not forced to
suspend specie payments, our whole system of prices suffered convulsions
almost matching those of the Civil War.In 1917 we sought to mobilize
all our economic resources in a hurry for military ends, and had to demo-
bilize the war workers, as well as the army, in 1919.Our railways
declined in efficiency.We poured millions into war plants and ships
that had to be sc.rapped after the armistice.We took about 5,000,000
of our best producers out of civilian life.We lost 116,000 soldiers and
sailors, and shared in the influenza epidemic of 1918.These costs were
real, and must be considered in 'any accounting of the economic effects
Walter F. Wilicox, "Military Losses in the World War," Journal of the American
Statistical Association, September, 1928, vol. XXIII, pp. 304—5; and "Population
and the World War," ibid., June, 1923, vol. XVIII, pp. 699—712.848 RECENT ECONOMIC CHANGES
of the war just as much as the profits which the war brought to
American business enterprises.
Even if items which cannot be expressed adequately in dollars were
set aside, it would be exceedingly difficult to strike a balance between the
war gains and the war losses.That task is not attempted here.But
it is proper to note the fluctuations in the country's "real" income during
the war, that is, income in dollars of constant purchasing power.These
figures; given in Chapter XII, are estimates based on the critical study
of a vast mass of materials; they have been made and revised with scru-
pulous• care; they are probably the most reliable, as well as the most
inclusive, index of changes in the economic position of the average family.
In the last full year before the war, a year which began with brisk trade
but ended in dullness, the per-capita income of Americans, taken at. the
retail prices of 1925, was $621.(See Chapter XII, Table 1, column 6.)
Starting with this figure as 100, per-capita income shrank to 97 in 1914,
rose to. 99 in 1915, to 106 in 1916, remained constant at that level in
1917, and then declined to 105° in 1918.On this showing, we were far
from impoverished during the war; but our economic progress was not
remarkably rapid.6 °
Norcan we close the reckoning of the war's influence upon real
income with 1918, either in the United States or in other countries.The
readjustment of economic activities to peace is one of the costs of war.
And that readjustment is more than a matter of beating swords into
ploughshares.In proportion as the belligerent nations had succeeded
in mobilizing all their economic resources for war, not only their govern-
ments, but also their business enterprises and individual citizens had to
reorganize their plans after the armistice.The business mistakes made
during this period of confusion are largely chargeable to the confusion
itself.Other countries found the process of readjusting even more
The showing is less favorable if we take the everyday conception of income
as including only sums received in money.On this basis, the per capita figures,
expressed in dollars of 1925 purchasing power, run as. follows:
Per-capita Relative
income income
The chief items oiiiitted in these figures and included in those underlying the text
discussion are products used by the families which produce them, the rental
value of houses owned by their occupiers, and interest on the value of semiciurable



















difficult than did the United States.All our allies made matters worse,
as did we, by committing economic blunders in 1919 for which they
paid in 1921.What happened is sketched briefly in the next section.
But here we should note that income in the United States sank in the
early years of peace.Indeed, average real income per capita in the
United States'during. the eight years of war and postwar readjustments,
1914 to 1921, was less than the per capita income of 1913..That is not
a record of prosperity.
IV. PEACE AND THE ECONOMIC CONVULSIONS OF 1919-1921
Readily as they had accepted the economic regulations and restric-
tions imposed during the war, the American people threw off the yoke
eagerly after the armistice.. The "dollar-a--year" men returned to their
offices; the munitions plants closed and their workers dispersed; the
soldiers in training camps and in France were sent back to their homes
as rapidly as might be; Government price-fixing ended, and everyone
at liberty, to charge what he couldfor.his goods.The rationing
of raw materials, the granting of transportation "priorities," the conser-
vation program, the Federal regulation, of imports and exports, and the
Government control over shipping stopped at various dates.When the
Transportation Act of February, 1920, provided for returning the rail-
roads to private control, practically nothing was left of the war-time
mobilization. . .
Itwas not "business as usual," however, to which Americans returned
in 1919, but business as dominated by postwar conditions.Early in the
year there was grave uncertainty regarding the trend of affairs.Whole-
sale prices declined from December to .Februaryor March;. there was
much loose talk about the necessity of "liquidating labor;" the prevailing
business attitude was one. of "watchful waiting."But,
spring, signs of eager demand for goods beg In
hasnu.p-the-thought-that it may profitably await a further consider-
able reduction 'in prices • "6InJuly, the Bureau of Labor
wbolesale price index (as then constituted) jumped from 207 to 219, and
business boomed.
The extraordinary demand for goods, which produced this
transition from hesitation to feverish activity, came partly from foreign
countries.The underfed European populations bid eagerly for our
foodstuffs; also they were short of raw materials for their mills.Aided
by American credits, governmental and private, they could pay for what
they needed.So the physical volume o.f exports and their prices rose
together.The value of shipments, to Europe reached nearly $5,200,000,-
000 in 1919, 25 per cent higher than the preceding record, and double the
6FederalReserve Bulletin, May, 1919.850 RECENT ECONOMIC CHANGES
money valueanyyear since then.The removal of restrictions upon
foreign trade enabled our other customers also to buy in proportion to
their respective needs.The increase in the value of total exports over
1918 reached $1,771,000,000.
Domestic demands were scarcely less keen.
.,j91718.Hence there was need for buying more than the customary
quantiHes ëlbtliiñg, furnishings and other
comforts.Ordinary building had been discouraged during the
nonessential industry, and there was pressing call for more
Crops in 1918 had been but moderately good; stocks had been kept low;
numerous branches of civilian production had been purposely restricted.
High prices—were_asked Jor_the—cur.rent-supply--..of_finished commodities — ,
soonproved inadequa-te:Butforatime were
almost any price for prompt deliveries.Employment had been full for
three years, soldiers commonly had substantial sums due them when
musthred out, new jobs were readily had at high money wages, everyone
seemed tired of economizing.
Under these circumstances, 1919 developed into a great trading year.
Interest rates remained fairly low until late autumn; the Treasury was
floating its great Victory loans that summer and wanted easy money to
facilitate subscriptions.Orders for goods from merchants, contractors
and manufacturers promised a continuation of good times.A run-away
market developed on the New York Stock ExChange for industrials.
Paper profits, present and prospective, seemed very high.
from the point of view of production.The
• harvests,indeed, turned out well; there was a large
there were fair crops of corn and cotton.It was in mining and industry
that the record was bad.The following collection of indexes of produc-
tion, in Table 1, made on unlike plans by different investigators, all agree
in showing that output in physical terms was decidedly less in 1919 than
in the preceding years.By strenuous effort we had kept production at
a high level in 1917 and 1918, despite the withdrawal of more than a
million men from our mines and factories.In the first
when many of these. men_got declined.These.
production confirm and are confirmed 1y the estimates
of per capita income in dollars of constant purchasing power.The
figure for 1918 had been $651.For 1919 it was $611.
More insight into the nature of the industrial inefficiency of 1919 is
provided by the indexes from the censuses of manufactures presented in
Chapter II.The most significant figures for the present purpose relate
to productivity per wage earner.Of course one expects average produc-
tivity per worker to rise gradually in a country which keeps abreast of
technical progress.Such,an advance we find from 1899 to 1909—the
_________________________________________________A REVIEW 851
index of productivity per worker in this period runs 100 in 1899, 104 in
1004, and 110 in 1909. We may explain the relapse to 108 in 1914 by
the business depression of that year.But the further decline to 104 in
the boom year 1919 must mean that both management and labor were
deplorably lax.Probably it means also that, during the war, we had
neglected Our industrial equipment for civilian production and made but
few improvements in method.




























































Includes 4 types of metal production, 2 types of textiles, 3 types of fuel, 4 types of animal and
2 of vegetable foods, lumber, cement, leather, newsprint and 3 types of tobacco products—22 series in
all.See Federal Reserve Bulletin, May, 1924, p. 422.
0Includes39 series of production or consumption data—a somewhat more inclusive list than the
Federal Reserve Board's "basic industries.""Secular trend is eliminated and correction made for
normal seasonal variation."See Statistical Bulletin of the Standard Statistical Company, April 21,
1924, p. 28.
The indexes, originally made by E. E. Day, in their latest form.See W. Floyd Maxwell, "The
Physical Volume of Production in the United States," Review of Economic Statistics, July, 1927, p. 143.
The business boom of 1919 developed with extraordinary quickness,
and in rather extreme form, the internal stresses characteristic of such
episodes.A rapid expansion of commercial loans reduced the reserve
ratios of the Federal Reserve banks below 50 per cent in October.On
November 3, the New York bank raised its rediscount rate.Stock
prices tumbled promptly.But as usually happens in booms, commercial
activity continued to expand for some months after the stock-market
collapse.The further expansion of commitments added to the accu-
mulating tension.Though the other Reserve banks followed the example
of New York in raising their rediscount rates, the Reserve ratio continued
to sag.By February, 1920, the figure was below 43 per cent, and there
it remained for several months of growing uneasiness.Meanwhile, prices
at wholesale climbed unsteadily to 247 in May—an advance of 54 points
on the prewar base since the dizzy rise had started in March of the852 RECENT ECONOMIC CHANGES
preceding year.Then came the turn.Slowly at first, soon rapidly,
prices gave way.In half the time it had taken prices to rise 54 points,
they dropped 68 points.7
At the close of the Civil War, wholesale prices had fallen from 216
in January, 1865, to 158 in July—a drop of over 25 per cent in six months.
That fall produced no grave crisis.The business community had
expected the greenback dollar to appreciate in gold when the Confederacy
collapsed.Grant's successes against Lee and Sherman's march to the
sea gave timely warning of what was coming, both at the front and behind
the lines.Because business men prepared for the worst, keeping com-
mitments and inventories at a minimum, the country passed through this
/siiUden fall of prices with extraordinary success. ( Thecorresponding drop of prices in 1920—21 caught the business
community in a different frame of mind and in a different technical
Perhaps if the fall had come soon after the armistice, when
many expected it and almost everyone was cautious, it would have
passed off much as in 1865.But prices had risen in 1919, the volume
of trade had expanded, profits had been high, the preliminary warnings
of the Federal Reserve banks had been ineffectual, and, when the turn
came, many business enterprises were caught with heavy inventories and
heavy future commitments.So the fall of prices, which started gently
enough, was accentuated by the efforts of embarrassed houses to turn
commodities into cash.Every price decline made the financial position
of overexpanded enterprises worse, reinforced the fears of insolvency
and the pressure for liquidating indebtedness, thus increased the pressure
to realize upon stocks of goods, and so forced prices lower still.
Three favorable factors prevented this crisis from degenerating into
a panic.Though European demand for our goods declined somewhat
from the high level of 1919, the demand from other countries scored a
more than compensating increase.The total value of our exports
exceeded in 1920—which still stands as the record figure.
Second, retail demand from domestic consumers remained active to the
end of the year.The Federal Trade Commission estimates total retail
sales as nearly 35 billion dollars in 1919 and over 38 billions in
Third, and probably most important, the Federal Reserve System, with
its organization of banking reserves, enabled our banks to meet the
Here the latest form of the Bureau of Labor Statistics index on the 1913 base is
used.See Index Numbers of Wholesale Prices on Prewar Base, U. S.: Department
of Labor, 1928, pp. 7, 8.
8SeeWesley C. Mitchell, Gold Prices and Wages under the Greenback Standard,
Berkeley, Calif., 1908, p. 23.The index used is the unweighted median of the relative
prices of 92 commodities.
See National Wealth and Income, Senate Doc., No. 126, 69th Cong., 1st Sess.,
Washington, 1926, pp. 306—313.A REVIEW 853
emergency needs of business far more effectively than in previous crises.
There was no such suspension of payments by banks, no such refusal of
credit to solvent enterprises, as in 1893 and 1907.
The net resultant of the complex of forces was a drastic financial
liquidation, which presently produced, and was then aggravated by, a
severe industrial depression.Business enterprises, fearing for their
solvency, canceled orders freely; enterprises in a less precarious condition
bought hand-to-mouth on the falling markets; concerns which had been
making up stocks of raw materials reduced their working forces instead
of buying new stocks.Discharges mounted month by month, until the
number of unemployed in 1921 alarmed the nation.'°In consequence,
retail buying fell off—by 7.6 billion dollars, according to the Federal
Trade Commission.Thus one of the timbers which had shored up
business in 1920 gave way under the prolongation of the strain.A second
support failed; other countries were suffering misfortunes like our own,
so that our exports dropped 3.7 billion dollars, 45 per cent, below the
preceding year.
Amidst these unfavorable circumstances, business losses swelled to
prodigious figures.The rise of prices from the middle of 1915 to May,
1920, had rendered money-making overeasy.Speculation in commodities
had been encouraged; the penalties for inefficient operation and risky
financing had been relaxed.The numbers and the liabilities of bank-
ruptcies had declined to half their prewar levels.Thus, when prices
began their precipitous fall, the American business community Contained
a dangerously large proportion of weak enterprises.Despite the extra-
ordinary efforts of bankers, supported by the Federal Reserve System,
to prevent avoidable failures, business mortalities trebled between 1919
10PresidentHarding called a Conference on Unemployment, of which Mr. Hoover
was chairman.For a committee of the conference, the National Bureau of Economic
Research made a fact-finding study, published in 1923 under the title Business Cycles
andUnemployment.In this report, the best estimates we could make of the extent
of unemployment in 1921 were summarized thus:
"There seems good ground for believing that,in actual diminution of em-
ployment, the depression of 1921 was almost twice as acute as that of 1908 and at
least twice as acute as that of 1914—15."William A. Berridge (p. 59).
•"The figures show that the depression brought about a reduction in the number
employed in every industry except the hand trades, and the trivial increase in that
One field is scarcely sufficient to keep pace with the growth of population.The
reduction in all industries amounted to about 4,000,000 workers, or nearly one-
seventh of all persons employed at the crest of the 1920 boom."Willford I. King
(p. 86).
The new estimate, given in the chapter on labor iii the present report, states
the "average minimum volume of unemployment" at 4,225,000 in 1921 as compared
with 1,305,000 in 1920.These figures are not inconsistent with the earlier ones; for
they give averages for years on a minimumbasis, whereas King used quarterly
data and attempted to reach a maximum figure.854 RECENT ECONOMIC CHANGES
and 1921.Liabilities increased more than fivefold."What happened
to the bulk of enterprises is perhaps best indicated by the reports of
corporations to the Internal Revenue Office, though even these official
returns must be accepted with reservations.As the following table
shows, more than half of the corporations reported that they lost money
TABLE 2.—CORPORATE FNCOME TAX
• Total netTotal deficit Percentage
. Netincome income ofof corpora-
Thousands reporting
corporationstions report-of all report-
Year reportingjag no neting corpora-
lions report- net incomes income tioris
ing Net No net(millions of(millions of (millions
incomeincome dollars) dollars) of dollars)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1916 341 61 39 8,766 657 8,109
1917 351 66 34 10,730 630 10,100
1918 318 64 36 8,362 690 7,672
1919 320 65 35 9,411 996 8,415
1920 346 59 41 7,903 2,029 5,874
1921 356 48 .52 4,336 3,878 458
1922 383 56 44 6,964 2,194 4,770
1923 399 58 42 8,322 2,014 6,308
1924 417 57 43 7,587 2,224 5,363
1925 430 59 41 9,584 1,963 7,621
1926 455 57 43 9,673 2,169 7,504
10276 453 55 45 8,068 2,311 5,757
From of the Unitcd ,Siat€u, 1926, pp. 190, 191, and Statistics of Income, Treasury
Department, 1925—1927.
6Preliminaryreport, based on returns filed to August 31, 1928.
in 1921.If we subtract the deficits of the losers from the net incomes
of the concerns which admitted making money, we find that the balance
of profits falls from eight billions of dollars in 1919 to less than half a
billion in 1921.Probably that statement exaggerates the drop in net
corporate income.But it is safe to say that, in the course of the drastic
readjustment, a considerable fraction of the accumulated war-time profits
was swallowed up.'2

















12 Mr.George 0. May, one of the directors of the National Bureau who has
intimate knowledge of such matters, points out some of the uncertainties which
becloud these figures.
During the period of the excess-profits tax, profits were affected by several unusual
factors.For example, war contracts were let in many cases on highly profitable
terms, with the thought in mind that a major fraction of the profits woiila be recoupe4A REVIEW 855
3.—A CONSPECTUS OF BUSINESS CONDITIONS IN 17 COUNTRIES, 1919—1921
Country 1919 1920 1921
United States. .. Revival,prosperity.Prosperity, recession,Depression.
depression.
European allies:
England Revival, prosperity.Prosperity, recession,Deep depression.
depression.
France Depression, revival,Prosperity, reces8ion,Depression, re-
boom, depression. viva!.




South Africa.. . Revival,prosperity.Prosperity, recession,Deep depression.
depression.
Australia Prosperity. Prosperity, recession.Depression.
India Revival, prosperity.Prosperity, recession,Depression.
depression.
European neutrals:
Sweden Depression, revival.Boom, recession, de-Depression.
pression.
Netherlands Revival, prosperity.Prosperity, recession,Depression.
depression.
South American powers:
Argentina Prosperity. Prosperity, recession.Depression.
Brazil Prosperity. Prosperity, recession,Severe depression.
depression.
Oriental powers:
Japan Depression, revivalProsperity, recession,Depression.
prosperity, depression.
China Prosperity. Prosperity, recession, Depression.
depression.
Central powers and Russia:
Germany Depression. Depression. Revival, Spring.
Austria Depression. Stow revival. Revival.
Russia Depression. Depression. Depression.
Rearranged from Willard L. Thorp, Business Annals, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1926,
p. 86.
through the tax.On the other hand, large sums were spent for advertising or other
plans for future expansion and charged as current expenses.
One of the chief reasons why the profits reported in 1917 were so much larger
than in 1918 is that in the former year the tax was retroactive.Hence there was
less opportunity in 1917 than in to enter into transactions which would reduce
taxable income.In comparing 1917 with later years, it should be noted also that the
law has been made more liberal to the taxpayer in important respects; for instance,
by allowing discovery depletion and by increasing depletion allowances at large.
Finally, there is little duplication of income in the returns, but much duplication
of losses.That is, the net-income figures exclude dividends received from other
corporations; but if one corporation loses money and fails, it will report its loss directly,
and other corporations which are its creditors or stockholders will also report what
they have lost by its failure.Hence the figures in the last column of the table over-
state the fluctuations in net corporate income, while the figures in column 4 under-
state them.856 RECENT ECONOMIC CHANGES
Though the boom of 1919, the crisis of 1920, and the depression of
1921 followed the pattern of earlier cycles, we have seen how much this
cycle was influenced by economic conditions resulting from the war and
its sudden ending.These influences were world-wide.If American busi-
ness men were betrayed by postwar demands into unwise courses, so were
business men in all countries similarly situated.Table 3, based upon a
critical study of business conditions by Dr. Willard L. Thorp, gives a
conspectus of conditions in seventeen countries, classified according to
their relation to the war.It shows that the course of business affairs
in the United States from 1919 to 1921 was almost exactly paral-
leledby the course ofaffairsin the leading European allies, in
four great British dependencies on four continents, in the two European
neutrals studied, in two South American nations, in Japan and .in China.
Each of these thirteen countries had its ordinary supplies for civilian uses
gravely restricted during the war; to each peace brought a hectic season
of activity (mildest in Italy); each suffered a recession in 1920 and a
depression in 1921.In only three countries does the record differ
widely from that of the United States, and these are countries where the
fortunes of war and peace had an opposite cast.Russia's internal
troubles kept her economic lifein disorder.Germany and Austria
suffered depression in 1919—1920 while their victorious opponents enjoyed
prosperity, and emerged into revivals in 1920—192 1 while their opponents
were liquidating postwar booms.Not until this liquidation was finished
did economic life resume its independent way.Even then, factors
arising from the war continued to exercise an important influence.
V. FACTORS AFFECTING AMERICAN FORTUNES IN 1922-1927
Among the factors which have shaped economic developments in the
United States since the first postwar cycle ended its wild career, we may
notefirstcertain unfavorable conditions which business has had
to surmount.
Conditions in Other Countries.—Prosperity in other countries to
which it sells its products tends to beget prosperity in the producing
nation.Similarly, depression in foreign markets reacts unfavorably
upon domestic business.These international influences gain in scope
and energy as nations are drawn closer together by improvements in
transportation and communications.Hence the business annals of the
nineteenth century show a secular trend toward increasing similarity
of economic fortunes among trading nations.Though capable of meeting
most of its own needs and separated from the other leaders in commerce
by broad oceans, the United States feels the reflex influence of business
conditions in every country with which it deals on an appreciable scale.A REVIEW 857
Prosperity here is heightened by active foreign demand for our products,
and depression abroad is an unfavorable factor in our home affairs.'3
Such prosperity as the. United States has enjoyed since 1922 owes
less than usual to foreign stimulation and support.Table 4, a con-
tinuation of Table 3, shows that few countries have fared so well as we
in the last six years.Compared with most of the nations represented,
if not• judged by the standard we like to set for American prosperity,
the United States has been well off.
Department of Commerce figures support this inference from business
annals.After an extraordinary fall from 1920 to 1921 or 1922, the
value of American exports and imports began to increase again.But
imports increased at the more rapid rate.In 1919—1921, the value of
our imports made only 56 per cent of the value of our exports.In 1922—
1927, this percentage rose to 86.That figure is decidedly higher than
the prewar average of 78 per cent in 1910—1914.When 1913 records
are taken as 100, the averagesfor 1922—1927 show the following changes:'4
The physical volume of imports increased 66 per cent.
The physical volume of exports has increased .33 per cent.
The prices of imports have increased 31 per cent.
The prices of exports have increased 38 per cent.
The dollar values of imports have increased 117 per cent.
The dollar values of exports have increased 81 per cent.
If we grant that the real goal of economic effort is to secure goods
for meeting human wants, it follows that a country's gains from inter-
national trade consist of its imports.Exports represent costs—prices
paid for the goods desired.In this sense, the fact that our imports
have grown faster than our exports means that the outside world had
increased its contribution to our economic welfare more rapidly than
we have increased our contribution to the economic welfare of other
countries.But from the business point of view, the preceding figures
mean that by enlarging our purchases more than our sales we have
stimulated trade in other countries more than other countries have
stimulated trade here.'5
13SeeWillard L. Thorp, Business Annals, National Bureau of Economic Research,
1926, pp. 73—100.
Commerce Yearbook, 1928, Vol. 1, pp. 86 and 91.
Thepercentage changes in our imports and exports have varied widely from
one class of commodities to another and from country to country.It is solely to the
broadest features of our foreign commerce as a whole that the statements in the
text refer.It should be noted also that the discussion is confined to the merchan-
disc factor in international dealings.A fuller discussion covering "invisible" as
well as visible items may be found in Chap. XI, Foreign Market and Loans858 RECENTECONOMIC CHANGES
TABLE 4.—CONSPECTUS OF BUSINESS FLUCTUATIONS IN 17COUNTRIES1922—1927
Country 1922 1923 1924







































































































































Further, unless the most inclusive of statistical indexes are grievously
in error, our domestic business as a whole has grown faster than our
foreign business.Comparisons like those just given, which credit
exports with an 81 per cent increase, show that on the basis of 1913
records as 100:
Thedollar of the average national income per in
1922—1926 increased 121 per cent.
The dollar volume of average yearly bank clearings outside of
New York in 1922—1927 increased 175 per cent.
So, too, the Department of Commerce finds that value of manu-
factured goods produced in the United States has grown much faster
since 1919 than the value of manufactured exports.Indeed, the fraction
of these products exported in 1925 was smaller than the prewar average.'6
In particular, American prosperity has been marred by agricultural
depression, and agricultural depressiQn has been due in part to foreign
conditions.
The war brought an increased export demand for American bread-
stuffs and meat.When the United States entered the struggle, and
millions of tons of shipping were required for transpOrting our army to
France, there was further reason for avoiding the long hauls of food from
Argentina, Australia and India.There was danger also that enlistments
would reduce our harvests.One of the first war measures of the Govern-
ment was the creation of a Food Administration.In other industries,
price-fixing meant setting of maximum prices; Congress itself set a
minimum price of $2 a bushel on wheat, and authorized the President to
raise the minimum higher if need be.
Farmers responded to these war demands as fully as they could.
According to the census returns, they had increased the area harvested
by 28 million acres between 1899 and 1909; between 1909 and 1919 they
added 37 million acres.Yields are always at the mercy of the weather;
but the Harvard index of physical production in agriculture shows an
16Exportsof manufactured goods in relation to domestic production, in mil-
lions of dollars, are shown in the following table.aThe value of materials enter-
ing factories is necessarily approximate, and hence is expressed as a maximum or
minimum.
Value added





1919 12,500—14,500 24,800 38,300—40,3005,44913.5—14.2
1921 8,000— 9,400 18,330 26,300—27,7002,722 9.8—10.3
1923 11,500—13,200 25,850 37,300—39,1002,625 6.7— 7.0
1925 12,000—13,500 26,800 38,500—40,0003,079 7.6— 8.0
From Yearbook,1928, vol. I, p. 93.860 RECENT ECONOMIC CHANGES
acceleration in the rate of growth when averages are taken for several
years.This index rose 5 points on the 1899 basis between 1904—1908
and 1909—1913, 12 points between 1909—1913 and 1914—1918, and 2
points more between the war period and 1919—1921—though the last
year was one of poor crops.
Thus the war left American agriculture with expanded facilities for
production.And the good times had lasted long enough to let even
this occupation, which must wait upon nature, base its finances on the
unstable prospect of continued high prices and' high profits.In the
corn belt, the regions where wheat growing was expanding, and in certain
tobacco-planting sections, farm lands had risen to prices unheard of
before, and thousands of enterprising men had bought all the land they
could acquire by stretching their credit to the utmost.
The imperious needs of underfed Europeans had swelled our agri-
cultural exports in 1919 to more than 4 billion dollars—much more than
the war-year figures.Even in 1920, agricultural exports were valued
at nearly 3.5 billions.But then came a sudden fall in the foreign demand.
The total value of agricultural exports shrank in 1921 by 1.3 billion
dollars, and in 1922—1927 it fluctuated about an average lower than that
of 1921—1.9 billions as compared with 2.1.,
For this shrinkage in exports it is easy to account.Price reductions
are a large part, but' not all, of the story.After demobilization, European
farmers could get all the labor they required; gradually' they restored
their depleted stocks of farm animals and their accustomed use of
fertilizers.Also there were fewer European mouths to feed in 1920
than there had been in 1917, or even in 1910.Thus Europe became less
dependent on foreign countries for food than it had been during the war.
Second, shipping became superabundant, freights fell to very low levels,
and the world's commerce slipped back toward its old channels.The
United States lost most of its war-time advantage from a short haul.
Third,our competitorsinfoodproduction—especially Argentina,
Canada and Australia—.-were expanding their output of meat and cereals
vigorously.With cheaper lands, they could make things most uncom-
fortable in world markets for farmers in the United States.Finally,
cotton crops were small in these years, mainly because of the boll weevil,
and the high level of prices made it difficult for the impoverished countries
of Europe to buy the quantity needed to furnish employment in their
factories and cotton fabrics to their people.
Reckoned in physical units, our agricultural remained above
the prewar levels in 1922—1927.But they fell below the levels to which
American farmers had adjusted their output in 1917—1920.To sell
even these reduced quantities, they have had to accept prices whicb in
most cases were low in comparison with the prices of otherA REVIEW 861
TABLE 5.—DOMEsTIc EXPORTS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS FROM THE UNITED
STATES, BY AVERAGES. OF PERIODS OF YEARS
Physical quantities of
Total value Values of exports of exports of




Five grains Cotton Five grains Cotton
Millions ofMillions ofMillions ofMillions ofMillions of
dollars dollars dollars bushels bales
1909—1913 966.5 88.1 541.7 112.9 8.5
1914—1918 1,842.8 386.8 511.1 315.2 6.1
1919—1921 3,221.1 638.4 936.0 358.9 6.4
1922—1927 1,942.1 288.6 855.3 191.6 7.8
Sources: CommerceYearbooks.
Monthly Sumniary of Foreign Commerce.
Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States.
Table 5 shows the basic facts concerning exports.Table 6, comparing
production and exports, is even more illuminating.More than in average
prewar years, American farmers, with their increased output, had to
depend on the domestic markets.They fared ill, and their hard times
created more difficulties for other American industries than the prevalence
of depression in foreign countries.
TABLE 6.—PRODucTI0N OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND
PROPORTION EXPORTED, BY CENSUS YEARS









































































Sources: CommerceYearbook8 and Agricultural Ycarbooka.
aMaximumandminimum figures are used because the value ofmaterials entering factories must be
estimatedfrom imperfect data.
Values for calendar years estimated by averaging the values for the two adjacent fiscal years ending
June 3P.
The Prime Factor Making for Prosperity.—Past experience has
taught us that a period of depression will presently be followed by a
business revival.But when this revival will come, and whether it will862 RECENT ECONOMIC CHANGES
develop into full-blown prosperity, are matters which the past does not
tell.Each cycle has its own special features which require special expla-
nations.How the United States managed to attain a higher per capita
income in 1922—1927 than ever before, though conditions in most other
countries were not favorable, and though its basic industry, agriculture,
was depressed, is the outstanding problem of the cycles of 1921—1924,
1.924—1927 and 1927 to date.
The preceding chapters give many partial answers to this question.
All these answers may be condensed into one: Since 1921, Americans
have applied intelligence to the day's work more effectively than ever
before,Thus the prime factor in producing the extraordinary changes
in the economic fortunes of the European peoples during the nineteenth
century is the prime factor in producing the prosperity of the United
States in recent years.The old process of putting science into industry
has been followed more intensively than before; it has been supplemented
by tentative efforts to put science into business management, trade-union
policy, and Government administration.
Concrete instances of technical improvements in many mining,
metallurgical, and fabricating processes are given in the chapters on
industry.The remarkable results achieved are demonstrated statisti-
cally from census data showing output per worker.Similar, though
less striking, instances appear in the chapter on construction.Without
help from any extraordinary invention, the railroads also have attained a
higher level of operating efficiency.'7In farming there is an intriguing
report of new machines and new methods coming into use.Here too,
the record of average output per worker shows considerable gains.
All this means that since 1921 Americans have found ways of produc-
ing more physical goods per hour of labor than before.They have
received larger average incomes because they have produced more com-
modities and services.'8That is true in the aggregate, although not all
u Dr. Julius H. Parmelee, director of the Bureau of Railway Economics, has
kindly furnished a backward extension of the "index of railway operating efficiency,"
mentioned by Professor Cunningham in a preceding chapter.The yearly averages,
on a 1920—1924 base, run as follows: 1920, 99,7; 1921, 95.3; 1922, 96.5; 1923, 103.5;
1924, 104.8; 1925, 109.4; 1926, 113.5; 1927, 115.2; 1928, Ja.n.—Nov., 118.1.
18.Lncreasedproductivity per man at work does not necessarily mean larger real
income per head of the population.In some industries the output per worker rises
in periods of business depression when total output falls; because the less efficient
hands have been laid off; because the men kept on the pay roll are afraid of discharge
when new jobs are scarce and so work harder than usual; because only the best-equipped
or best-managed plants can keep running at all, or for other reasons.As will
presently be shown more at length, the number of men at work in two of our great-
est branches of industry—farming and manufacturing—has been reduced.But
the reductions in numbers at work have not offset the increases in output per remain-
ing worker, even in these branches.There remains a net gain in real income per capita
for the whole country.A REVIEW 863
who have contributed to the increase in physical shared
in the increase of real income.The important exceptions to the general
rule will be discussed presently.
The reality of the gains made by improving the technique of farming,
railroading, manufacturing, and building seems to be established beyond
question.There is room for doubt only concerning the pace of recent
progress in comparison with earlier spurts of technical improvement.
Comparisons between output per worker in later years and in 1919 often
show sensational gains.But that is largely because 1919 made a wretched
record of physical inefficiency.According to Chapter II, Industry, the
census of manufactures places this year below 1914, and still further
below 1909, in output per worker.The above-cited estimates of national
income per capita in dollars of constant purchasing power confirm this
showing, and so do index numbers of physical production in Table 1.
Nor does 1921, a year of severe depression, afford a satisfactory basis
of comparison.Thus it is difficult to measure the technical progress
of 1922—1927, with the data now available.It is still more difficult to make
reliable measurements for earlier years, when censuses were taken at
longer intervals and fewer supplementary figures were published.But
doubts whether the rate of improvement in the past six years is unpre-
cedented are not of great moment.It remains clear that the Industrial
Revolution is not a closed episode; we are living in the midst of it, and the
economic problems of to-day are problems of its making.
While the details of the latest technical advances always possess
thrilling interest, perhaps there is more of promise for the future in the
chapters on recent changes in economic policy.The efforts to apply
scientific methods to such matters are in an early stage of development.
Thesciences which underlietheseefforts—psychology,sociology,
economics—are far less advanced than physics and chemistry.The
experts who are making the applications—personnel managers, advertis-
ing specialists, sales directors, business economists and statisticians—are
less rigorously trained than engineers.It is even harder to measure the
results they achieve than to determine what difference a new machine
makes in unit costs.Nor are business executives so generally convinced
of the practical value of the rather intangible services which the new
professions can render as they are of the indispensability of engineering
advice.Yet it is conceivable that applications of the social sciences,:
now in their tentative stage, will grow into contributions of great moment
to economic welfare.Certainly the chapters in this report on market-.
ing, management and labor show that many enterprising business con-
cerns and some enterprising trade unions are trying new policies, and
often getting results which they deem good.
Perhaps none of the changes reported here will prove more
in the long run than the change in the economic theories on which the864 RECENT ECONOMIC CHANGES
American Federation of Labor and certain outside unions- are acting.
That organizations of wage earners should grasp the relations between
productivity and wages, and that they should take the initiative in press-
ing constructive plans for increasing efficiency upon employers, is not
wholly without precedent; but the spread of such ideas and the vigor with
which they are acted on by large organizations must startle those who
have believed that trade unions are brakes upon economic progress.
Scarcely less significant is the report from the employing side.Our
investigators believe that the art of business management turned a corner
in 1921, cultivating since then more skillful understanding of the whole
situation and nicer adjustment of means to the environment.
Numerous corporations and some trade associations are maintaining
• research• bureaus of their own.Among the managerial .devices experi-
mented with, are co-ordinated staffs in place of one "big boss," bonus
payments to executives and "incentive wages" for the rank and file,
operating budgets, forecasts of business conditions,close inventory
control, personnel management and employee representation.Most
of these devices are attempts to understand and to utilize the psycho-
logical forces which control human behavior, or the economic forces
which control business activity."There is today not only more produc-
tion per man, more wages per man and more horse power per man;
there is also more management per man."9Marketing—traditionally
the part of business in which native shrewdness, experience and "personal
magnetism" have been held all-important—even marketing is being
permeated by applied psychology.Costly investigations of "consumer
appeal," of advertising "pull," of resistance "—the very terms
Onthis passage Colonel M. C. Rorty comments as follows:
One of the most significant results arising from improvements in the science of
management has been an increasing ability to secure from large units or "chains"
the type of individual efficiency that, a few years ago could be only in the
small organization working under the direct supervision of a competent employer-
owner.Under the older type of organization there was a gain in efficiency with size,
up to the point where the reductions in costs, through ability to specialize and func-
tionalize the work of a larger group of workers and the increases in process, purchasing
and selling efficiency under larger scale operation, began to be more than offset by a
reduced general efficiency due to the inability of the employer-owner to maintain
close contacts with the members of the enlarged organization.Recent developments
in management methods, and in accounting and statistical control, have apparently
broken down these former economic limitations on the size of the individual organ-
ization or "chain," with the result that practically all types of business and industry
are now open to efficient large-scale Corporate control..If this tendency persists,
it may represent a fundamental econOmic change having very, far-reaching conse-
quences.The field of. operations for the independent owner-manager will be steadily
restricted, and the young man of capacity and intelligence will have to look forward
more than ever before to a career in which, except by some rare combination of good
fortune and adaptability to circumstances, he will continue throughout to be a sub-
ordinate worker in a large corporation organization.ARE VIEW 86'5
would have been to our fathers—show that sales managers
are trying to base their planning upon factual studies of human behavior.
And the rapid spread of chain stores and of installment selling show that
marketing methods are no more standing still than is industrial technique.
By the side of these rather definite changes in trade-union and in
business policy, we may set the influence of certain general ideas which
have gained wide currency in the last few years.
First, there is the spirit of caution, manifested in minimizing future
commitments, in hand-to-mouth buying by merchants, in efforts to keep
down inventories or to pass the need for keeping large stocks on to the
concern from which one buys.This lesson is taught afresh by every
great crisis.The staggering financial losses of 1920—21 enforced the
old moral emphatically; the sagging course of commodity prices has kept
it in mind, and the increased operating efficiency of producers and rail-
roads has made possible close scheduling of merchandise transactions.
The Florida land boom and the stock-market adventure of 1928 indicate
the course American business might have taken in the absence of all
restraint.
Associated with the prudence which has tempered enterprise is a more
systematic effort to learn from experience.Here there seems to be a
new emphasis, if not a new practice.Most can be learned from experi-
ence when it is exactly known, and seen in relation to its environment.
The most exact records of economic experience are statistical in form.
Since the war, an increasing number of officials, publicists and business
men have fostered the keeping of better statistical records, and have
analyzed past experience as a guide to future planning.Every reader
must realize that, without the aid of the new statistics which this wide-
spread effort has provided, the present survey of recent economic changes
would be more imperfect than it is.What is of use in providing a factual
basis for determining economic trends at large is not less useful in deter-
mining the factors which affect the success of private enterprises.
More publicity concerning business operations and closer co-operation
among business enterprises should also be noted as characteristic of the
day.These are features of American practice which impress all our
foreign visitors; the older rules of secretiveness and rivalry seem to have
maintained themselves more rigidly in other countries.Perhaps the
growth of trade associations and the expansion of their programs is the
clearest evidence of the new attitude.No doubt every industry has its
recalcitrants who; for one reason or another, refuse to play on the team;
but certainly there is a marked increase of readiness to join co-operative
programs of research and publicity, to interchange trade information, to
standardize products where standardization is good business, to consult
about methods and practices—in short, to treat the industry .for many866 RECENT ECONOMIC CHANGES
purposes as a unit in whose prosperity all members have a common
interest, and to inspire good will in the public by open dealings.
Fourth, belief in the economy of high wages has become prevalent
among the abler business executives, much as belief in increasing pro-
ductivity has become prevalent among the abler trade-union leaders.2°
To find a market for the wares turned out by mass production and urged
on consumers by national advertising, it is patently necessary to have
corresponding purchasing power in hands of consumers.Since
studies of the national income have demonstrated that wages constitute
by far the largest stream of personal income, it follows that wages per
man—or rather, wages per family—must be increased as production is
expanded. Perhaps most people would have accepted this argument in the
abstract at any time in the last hundred years.But many employers
in the past would have retorted with the assertion that high wages
undermine the moral stamina of the masses.To-day such talk is far less
common in the United States.Not only do many business executives
admit the general principle that paying high wages is good policy; they
are ready to assume what they consider their share of the responsibility
for putting the principle into practice.
The share of Government in recent economic changes has not been
made the subject of a separate chapter.But the service of one public
agency, the Federal Reserve System, is treated in the chapter on banking,
and the services of the Departments of Commerce, Agriculture, and
Labor in collecting and diffusing knowledge are mentioned in several
places.If the prime factor making for prosperity has been the applica-
tion of intelligence to the day's work, then Government agencies must be
credited with an indispensable, though indirect, part in what has been
accomplished.
Further, our Federal: Government has of late years manifested a
more intelligent attitude toward problems of economic organization than
it has manifested in the past.To treat business enterprises as agencies
for performing social services, to facilitate their operations, and to hold
them to this conception of their function, is a policy exceedingly difficult
to carry out.It requires a delicate combination of constructive inter-
vention at some, points and of clearing away obstacles at other points.
No one can say that this policy has become characteristic of Government
in. all of its dealings with business, any more than one can say that the
doctrine of high wages is accepted by all ,employers, or the theory that
increased productivity benefits labor is accepted by all trade-unionists.
Yet no one who has watched Federal policy, as practiced by the numerous
agencies which have to deal with economic issues, will question that a
change has occurred.Efforts to check extortion have not ceased; but
more regularly than in the past they are accompanied by active efforts
20Therise of this idea is sketched in Section VII, p.885.A REVIEW 867
to heighten the efficiency of what are judged to be legitimate enterprises.
Farmers and exporters are not the only beneficiaries.
To repeat: all of the changes making for prosperity which have been
recalled in this section, together with many others noted in preceding
chapters, can be summed up under a single head—applying fresh intelli-
gence to the day's work.From the use of abstruse researches in pure
to the use of broad economic conceptions and the use of common
sense, the method of American progress in 1922—1928 has been the old
method of taking thought.Peace let us turn our thoughts to common
matters, the hard times1921 spurred our efforts, and the complicated
consequences our efforts produced have kept us thinking.
VI. HARDSHIPS CAUSED BY INCREASING EFFICIENCY
Among the consequences which improvements in industrial technique
or in business methods produce in an individualistic state, are hardships
of various kinds.The victims are partly business competitors who are
a bit slow in adopting new methods; partly industries or geographic
regions affected indirectly; partly individuals who find their services
no longer needed.To follow all the complicated difficulties produced
by recent economic advances in the United States is out of the question;
but a few chains of cause and effect may be traced link by link.For
the queer mixture of prosperity and depression noted at the outset of this
chapter is due largely to the pressure which some group's growing
efficiency puts upon other groups.
ReductionsinUnit-costs,Prices,and Profits.—Thetechnical
advances of recent years in the United States have been largely advances
in the direction of more economical production. A greater volume of
goods has been turned out at lower costs per unit.Now larger supplies
sent to market tend to depress prices.
In most periods of prosperity this tendency has been more than
offset by an increase in demand.The cases have been few indeed when
the index numbers of wholesale prices have failed to rise in the prosperous
phase of a cycle.And there are clear marks of the standard reaction in
our period.The Bureau of Labor Statistics index number advanced
from 91.4 in January, 1922, to 104.5 in March, 1923.On the mild
recession of that year it reversed its course and declined to 94.9 in June,
1924.When business picked up again, the index began to climb once
more, reaching 104.8 in March, 1925.From that point it receded
unsteadily to 93.7 in April and May, 1927.Judged by prewar standards,
th'ese fluctuations have about the average amplitude.2'The remarkable
fact is that prices sagged through the prosperous year 1926.Taking the
HereI am using the enlarged Bureau of Labor Statistics index on the 1926
base.See Labor Review, July, 1928.For a comparison of the amplitudes
of prewar and postwar cycles in wholesale prices, see Table 11, p. 893.868 RECENT ECONOMIC CHANGES
whole period from 1922 to 1927, the trend has been a gently declining
one.Prices at wholesale have fallen at the rate of 0.1 per cent per
annum 22
Monetaryfactors, which are often held responsible for changes in
wholesale price levels, can scarcely be held responsible in this case.
In 1922—1927 international gold movements added $760,000,000 net to
our stock, and "earmarking" operations took less than $200,000,000 of
this sum out of monetary use.The banks suffered no stringency;
indeed they increased their other investments, because commercial
borrowers asked less credit than the banks would have been glad to lend.
So far as domestic conditions are concerned, business activity and the
easy money market might have combined to produce a vigorous advance
of prices.
But, though the fact is commonly overlooked, the course of prices
cannot be explained in any commercial nation of these days by domestic
conditions alone.Commodities subject to international trade on a
considerable scale cannot long maintain prices higher in one country
than in another by margins which exceed costs of carriage and handling,
import duties.Price fluctuations in different countries are tied
eyen closer to each other, as a rule, than actual prices; for though import
duties may establish a considerable spread between market prices in
two countries, these duties are not subject to very frequent change.
Shipping charges have been particularly low in the period under review,
so that this factor has interfered less than usual with market uniformity.
Even countries with inconvertible currencies are bound to the world
system of prices, and to its fluctuations, through the rate of exchange.
It is true that a large proportion of the articles dealt in on wholesale
markets, in such a country as the United States, are not exported or
imported on an appreciable scale.But economists have long since
shown that the prices of different goods prevailing in any country at any
time are closely related to each other through the channels of supply
and demand.Domestic prices thus constitute a system, in the sense
that a change in the price of any commodity affects, and is in turn affected
by, changes in the prices of a host of other goods.The statistical aspect
of. these interrelations is briefly developed in the preceding chapter on
Price Movements.Since all domestic prices are thus related to each
other, and since a considerable fraction of these prices are related to
foreign prices, changes in the general level of wholesale prices in any
one country must be related tothechanges taking place in the wholesale
price levels of other countries.
The validity of this conclusion has been statistically demonstrated.
For example, comparisons covering the 20 years 1890—1910, based on
American, English, French and German wholesale indexes of unlike
22See Chap. IX, Price Movements.A REVIEW 869
construction show strict conformity in the major movements and pre-
vailing conformity in the minor movements also.23Even during the
war, when commerce was so greatly hampered, American prices in gold
followed the gyrations of European paper prices reduced to a gold
basis.24Again in the first postwar cycle, the conformity discussed above
in general business conditions in a long list of countries was matched by
conformity in the course of wholesale prices, so far as index numbers
are available to show what happened.
That a similar conformity of wholesale price fluctuations in various
important countries marked the period 1922—1927 appears from the follow-
.ing charts, which show index numbers for 15 countries on a prewar base,
with the paper-money entries reduced to their gold equivalents.It will
be noted that the curves, which spread unusually far apart during the
war, have approached each other again.This tendency is most marked
in the countries where prices had diverged most widely from the average
course.Also it will be noted that prices in the United States pursue a
middle path.They run on a lower level compared with the prewar base
than prices in some countries, and on a higher relative level than in other
CHARTii—INDEX NUMBERS OF WHOLESALE PRICES IN UNITED STATES,
GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE, 1922-1928.
23 SeeChart 8 in the writer's Business Cycles, Berkeley, California, 1913, p. 121.
Index numbers including substantially identical lists of commodities in the United
States and England, the United States and France, and the United States and
Germany, show scarcely closer agreement than the standard series made from diver-
gent lists.
24See"International Price Comparisons.History of Prices during the War."
War Industries Board, Price Bulletin No. 2, Washington, 1919.
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CHART 4.—INDEX NUMBERS OF WHOLESALE PRICES IN UNITED STATES,
AUSTRIA AND SWITZERLAND, 1922-1928.
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countries.Of course, market fluctuations in this country have influenced
quotations in every other nation; but they have' also been influenced by
the latter quotations.It seems a fair inference from these charts, with
their convincing evidence of a common bond among the changes in price
levels of different nations, that prices in this country could not have
risen rapidly in 1922—1927 unless the forces behind the local advance
had been powerful enough to pull world markets up.25
CHART6.—INDEX NUMBERS OF WHOLESALE PRICES IN UNITED STATES,
JAPAN AND AUSTRALIA, 1922-1928.
INDEXNUMBER
25 Theindex numbers used in the charts are as follows:
United States—United States Bureau of Labor Statistics.
1913equal 100.
GreatBritain—"Statist" index number, 1913equal 100.
Revised index shifted to
From January, 1922, to
April, 1925, original value of the index was deflated by the exchange rate, New
York on London.
France—Index number from the Bulletin de La Statistique Générale de La France, deflated
by gold parity value, New York on Paris, 1913 equal 100.Values for June, July,
and August, 1928—new currency values now published in the Monthly Bulletin
of Statistics of the League of Nations.
Netherlands—Official index compiled by the Central Bureau of Statistics.The
index was originally computed on the, base 1901—1910, and has been shifted to
the 1913 base in the Monthly Bulletin of Statistics of the League of Nations.
From January, 1922, to April, 1925, the original value of the index was deflated
by exchange rates, New York on Amsterdam.
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Thus the reduction in unit costs, and the increase in the supply of
wares turned out by improved methods, combined with. international
forces to keep the American price level from rising buoyantly in the
active years of our period, as it has done in most periods of prosperity.
Presumably, the international factors have been more potent than the
domestic factors in producing the results.Yet we may count the reduc-
tions in cost by industrial leaders and the increases in output among
the manifestations of efficiency which have contributed to the difficulties
of making money in this period.
Sagging prices make it harder to conduct business with profit because
many of the expenses of an enterprise are fixed by long contracts or by
understandings hard to alter, and cannot be cut to offset a reduction in
selling rates.Above, we noticed how the rapidly rising prices of the
war and of 1919 swelled paper profits and reduced bankruptcies.Also
we noted how the sudden fall of prices in 1920—21 turned profits into
losses and swelled bankruptcies.In 122—1927, we find an intermediate
result.Concerns in the van of technical progress have done handsomely.
But the prices at which they could market their large outputs with
profit to themselves have meant loss and even failure to less aggressive
rivals.Dun's statistics of commercial failures yield the annual averages
shown in Table 7.The average number of failures in 1922—1927 has
Germany—1924 through 1928, new index number, 1913 equal 100.Source: Wirt-
schaft 'und Statistik.
Belgium—1922 through 1926, April, 1914 equal 100,goldbasis.Series compiled by
Ministry of Industry and Labor Statistics.Deflated by gold parity value—
New York on Brussels.Values for 1927 and 1928 published on the new currency
base.
Italy—1922 through 1927, gold basis.Gold parity value, New York on Rome,
used to deflate series compiled by Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Milan,
1913 equal 100.1928 values quoted on new currency base.
Austria—For 1922 kronen prices were deflated by gold parity values.1923—1927,
gold basis, January-June 1914 equal 100, as published in the Statistische Nach-
richten.New series begins in 1928.The value for January, 1928, is identical
with the value of the former series.
Switzerland—For 1922 through 1926, Dr. Lorenz index number, July 1914 equal 100:
From January, 1927, new official index number used.From January, 1922, to
October, 1924, the original value of the index was deflated by the exchange rate,
New York on Berne.
Canada—Dominion Bureau of equal 100.
Japan—Bank of Japan, 1913 equal 100.From January, 1922, to August, 1928,
the original value of the index was deflated by exchange rate, New York on
Yokohama.
South Africa—Official index number compiled by Census Office, 1910 equal 100.
Australia—Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, July, 1914 equal 100.
India—Official index number of wholesale prices at Calcutta, compiled by the Depart-
ment of Statistics, July, 1914 equal 100.874 RECENT ECONOMIC CHANGES
actually exceeded the number in 1921, but the total and the average
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Source: Commerce Yearbook, 1928, vol. I, p. 51.
"Profitless prosperity," like so many popular paradoxes, combines
an element of truth with an element of falsehood.One expects a period
of unusually rapid increase in efficiency to be a period of more than usual
inequality of profits.This expectation has been borne out by the experi-
ence of 1922—1927.As a whole, corporate incomes reported to the
Internal Revenue Bureau and summarized in Table 2, have been
large in the latest years for which we have data; but they, have not
equaled the records of 1916—1919.
Whether the enterprises which have lagged behind in cost reductions
and in earnings are mainly smaller enterprises, as has been contended, is
less sure.Of course this contention tends to become true with the lapse
of time, for the simple reason that the exceptionally profitable enterprises
grow exceptionally fast.The profitable enterprises of to-day tend td
become the large enterprises of tomorrow.But Dr. section of
the chapter on industry shows that there is no close relationship between
large size and low unit-cost, or between large size and high rates of
profit.It seems to be middle-sized enterprises, rather than small ones,
which have felt the severest pressure.But the facts, as the census shows
them, are complicated and cannot be adequately presented in a brief
statement.
The Competition of New Products and New Tastes.—Scarcely less
characteristic of our period than unit-cost reductions is the rapid
expansion in the production and sale of products 'little used or wholly
unknown a generation or even a decade. ago.Among consumers' goods,,
the conspicuous instances are automobiles, radios and rayon.But
the list includes also oil-burning furnaces, gas stoves, household electrical
appliances in great variety, automobile accessories, antifreezing mixtures,
cigarette lighters, propeller pencils, wrist watches, airplanes, and what
not.Among producers' goods we have the truck and the tractor compet-
ing with the horse and the mule, reinforced concrete competing withARE VIEW 875
brick and lumber, the high-tension line competing with the steam
engine, fuel oil competing with coal, not to mention excavating machines,
belt conveyors, paint sprayers, and "automatics ".ofmany sorts compet-
ing with manual labor.
Changes in taste are in large part merely the consumers' response to
the solicitation of novel products, effectively presented by advertising.
But that is not all of the story; the consumer is free to choose what he
likes among the vociferous offerings,, and sometimes reveals traces of
initiative.In what other terms can one explain, the changes in
pointed out in the first chapter?Americans are consuming fewer calories
per capita; they are eating less wheat and corn but more dairy products,
vegetable oils, sugar, fresh vegetables and fruit.More families than
ever before are sending their sons and daughters to college—surely that
is not a triumph of "high-powered" salesmanship.Young children,
girls and women, are wearing lighter and fewer clothes.The' short
skirt, the low shoe, the silk or rayon stocking, "athletic" underwear,
the soft collar, sporting suits and sporting goods, have an appeal which
makers of rival articles have not been able to overcome.And, in a sense,
every consumers' good, from college to candy, is a rival of every other
consumers' good, besides being a rival of the savings bank.
"When the makers of one product get a larger slice of the consumer's
dollar, the slices left for the makers of other products get smaller."
This way. of accounting for the hardships met by certain long-established
Industries in 1922—1927, such, for example, as the leather and woolen
trades, is popular and sound, so far as it goes.But it does not take
account of the fact that desire for new goods, or the pressure of install-
ment purchases once made, may lead people to work harder or more
steadily, and so get more dollars to spend.Presumably the enticements
of automobiles and radios, of wrist watches and electric refrigerators,
of correspondence courses and college,. have steadied many youths, set
many girls hunting for jobs and kept many fathers of families to the
mark.Also a considerable part of the country's former bill for intoxi-
cants has been available to spend in other ways.How much allowance
we should make for these factors nobody knows.All one can say with
assurance is that consumption per. capita has increased in volume to
match the increased per capita output of 'consumers' goods taken alto-
gether.Yet the increase in consumption has not been rapid enough to
prevent shifts in the kind of goods bought from pressing hard upon the
makers of articles waning in popular favor.
•'So too in the realm of producers' goods.Despite the active building
campaign, the lumber industry has had hard sledding.Coal mining has
not prospered, and can attribute part of its difficulties to other ,fuels,
water power, and more economical ways of burning coal itself.Breeders
of draft animals have found their markets cut into by motor vehicles.876 RECENT ECONOMIC CHANGES
Railways have lost traffic to trucks and omnibusses—though the loss in
freight tonnage is held by Professor Cunningham to be less than. the
public supposes.Steam-engine builders have had to change their
products or reduce their output.Itis not necessary to multiply
examples; most technical improvements reduce the demand for some
other good, and so create difficulties for those who supply the latter.
Geographical Shifts in Industry and Trade.—Just as definite a gain
may be made in productivity by shifting factories to better locations, or
by reorganizing channels of supply, as by installing automatic machines.
Besides the drift of cotton manufacturing to the South, of which everyone
thinks, and the more recent drift of shoe manufacturing to the West, the
chapter on industry shows a prevailing tendency toward geographical
decentralizing of production.The proportion of the output of many
goods coming from the old headquarters is on the The chapter
on agriculture indicates a parallel development in farming; The cotton
belt is stretching west, the wheat belt west and northwest; the dairying
and the market-garden areas are moving in various directions.Finally,
the chapter on marketing shows a concentration of trade in cities and
towns at the expense of villages.
Doubtless these changes are to the advantage of those who make
them.If they proved unprofitable, they would be abandoned.But
it is equally clear that we have here another feature of increasing efficiency
which brings losses as well as gains.New England may not lose as much
as North Carolina and St. Louis gain from the shifts in the cotton and
shoe trades—that is a question of the totals.And New England may
devise new ways of using her labor, her capital, her manufacturing sites,
and her ingenuity, more profitable than the old—necessity is often the
mother of invention.If these efforts succeed, they may create fresh
difficulties felt elsewhere.Similar truisms might be recited concerning
the other cases in point.But whatever happens in the future, we must
not let the dazzle of the high lights blind us to the sectional shadows.
"Technological Unemployment."—Among all the hardships imposed
by increasing efficiency, most publicity has been given to the decline in
the number of wage earners employed by factories.That is a matter
of the gravest concern in view of the millions of families affected or
threatened by the change, and in view of their slender resources.To it
special attention has been paid in this investigation.
The new phrase coined to describe what is happening, "technological
unemployment," designates nothing new in the facts, though the numbers
affected may be large beyond precedent.Ever since Ricardo shocked
his rigid disciples by admitting that the introduction of "labor-saving"
machinery may cause a temporary diminution of employment, economists
have discussed this problem.Granting Ricardo's admission, they have
nevertheless held that, in the long run, changes in method which heightenA REVIEW
efficiencytendtobenefit wage earners.English. experience since
Ricardo's day seems to bear out this contention.The power looms,
which put an end to hand-loom weaving after tragic struggles, have not
reduced the number .of British workers employed in weaving, or cut their
average earnings.The railways, which. displaced the. old mail coaches
and carters, have not reduced the number of transport workers or made.
them poorer.And the new trades of building and caring for the elaborate
modern equipment must not be forgotten.There doubtless are cases
in which improvements in methods have caused what promises to be a
permanent reduction in the number of persons employed in an'industry.
By defining industry narrowly, these cases can be made numerous.But
the broad result plainly has been that the industrial triumphs of the
nineteenth century increased, the demand, for labor arid increased its
rewards."Labor-saving" machinery has turned out to be job-making
machinery. . . '
Torecall these familiar facts should not diminish by. one jot our
rating of the hardships suffered by men. who are thrown out of. jobs.
They and their families often undergo severe privation before new employ-
ment can be found; the new jobs may pay less than the old or be less
suitable; too often the displaced man never finds a new opening.Tech-
nical progress is continually made at cost to individuals who have com-
mitted no fault and committed no avoidable error of judgment.No
organized plan has 'been evolved, for preventing such hardships, aside
from the schemes devised by .some.trade unions for tiding their members
over mechanical revolutions in their crafts.The nations have left the
remedy to "natural forces;" they have trusted that the expansion of
production, which improvements bring about, will presently op.en new
places for the displaced' workers. .
Theproblem of what happened in the short period 1922—1927, then,
is to find how many wage earners weredisplaced in that time, how many
of the displaced found new jobs and what these new jobs were.
To answer these questions accurately would require far better data than
are to be had.There are few branches of. statistics in which the United
States lags.further behind the leaders than in statistics of employment.
What we have been able to learn comes to this:
Starting with the 1920 census, of occupations and reckoning forward,
it is estimated that by 1927 there had been an increase of about 5,100,000
employees 16 years of age and over, who looked to nonagricultural
occupations for a living.The figure allows for the fact that some 860,000
persons had left the farms to seek elsewhere, and the more
than offsetting fact that the number of pupils over 15, enrolled in schools
and colleges, had risen by 1,430,000 between 1920 and 1927.
Of the 5,100,000 net additions to nonagricultural job seekers, a few
turned to mining and allied occupations; 100,000 entered public services,878 RECENT ECONOMIC CHANGES
over 600,000 engaged in construction work of some sort, nearly a million
attached themselves to "transportation and communica,tion," 1,400,000
became mercantile employees, and more than two and a half millions took
to miscellaneous occupations in hotels, restaurants, garages, repair shops,
moving-picture places, barber shops, hospitals, insurance work, profes-
sional offices, and the like.Manufacturing is the only large occupational
group, aside from farming, to show a decline.There the numbei of
employees fell from about 11,200,000 in 1920 to about 10,600,000 in
1927—a drop of 600,000.(See Chap. VI, Labor, Section IV.)
All these data are estimates of the net changes in numbers of persons
"attached to" the occupations in question.They show that American
wage earners met. "technological unemployment" in manufacturing
mainly by turning to other ways of making a living.The decline from
1920 to 1927 in the number of persons actually at work in manufacturing
enterprises is put at 825,000, but the number of unemployed among the
people who depended on factory work for a living increased only 240,000
between 1920 and 1927, according to the best• figures available.If
these estimates are approximately correct, then some 585,000 of the
workers laid off by factories had taken up other occupations.That is,
71 per cent of the workers displaced had attached themselves to new
by 1927.
Adopting a new occupation, however, does not guarantee getting a
new job.The surplus workers from our farms and factories who hunted
for fresh openings increased unemployment in other fields.The expan-
sion of business, particularly the expansion of miscellaneous and mercan-
tile occupations, made places for perhaps four and a half million new
wage earners.But the supply of new jobs has not been equal to the
number of new workers plus the old workers displaced.Hence there
has been a net increase of unemployment, between 1920 and 1927, which
exceeds 650,000 people.
The number of the unemployed has varied from year to year with
cyclical changes in business activity.It surpassed all previous records
in the depression of 1921; it declined rather slowly in the revival of 1922;
even in the busy year 1923 it remained higher than in 1920; it rose in
the mild recession of 1924, declined on the return of activity in 1925—26,
and then mounted again in 1927.The final estimates presented in the
chapter on labor may be summarized as follows:A REVIEW 879
TABLE8.—ESTIMATED MINIMUM VOLUME OF UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1920—1927
NonagriculturalwageAverage minimum Percentage ear and salary earnersnumber unemployed unemployed
1920 27,558,000 1,401,000 5.1
1921 27,989,000 4,270,000 15.3
1922 28,505,000 3,441,000 12.1
1923 29,293,000 1,532,000 .5.2
1924 30,234,000 2,315,000 7.7
1925 30,941,000 1,775,000 5.7
1026 31,808,000 1,669,000 5.2
1927 32,695,000 2,055,000 6.3
It must be emphasized that these figures are merely the best estimates
which it is possible to make from the scattered and imperfect materials
available.They are subject to considerable margins of error.They
minimize the seriousness of unemployment.Finally, even as minimum
figures, these estimates do not profess to show the high points reached
by unemployment in bad seasons—they give only yearly averages.
One may wonder at the versatility, initiative and mobility of Ameri-
cans, as evidenced afresh by their prompt shifting of occupations on so
great a scale in recent years.One may wonder also at the rapid expan-
sion of the trades which have absorbed some five million employees in
seven years without reducing wage rates.But one must not forget that
these shiftings have been compulsory in large measure; men have been
forced out of farming and forced out of factories as well as pulled into
automobile services, shops and restaurants.And the employment
balance is on the unfavorable side.While our economic progress has
meant larger per capita earnings for all workers taken together, it has
imposed severe suffering upon hundreds of thousands of individuals.
The Domestic Difficulties of Agriculture—It was noted above that
American farming owes part of its difficulties in 1922—1927 to reductions
in foreign demand and increases in foreign supply.It must now be
added that fresh difficulties have been created for farmers by changes
in domestic demand, and by the successful efforts of farmers to increase
their own efficiency as producers.
Chapter I shows that, all in all, the standard of living has been
rising in the United States of late.But Americans have been eating less
food per capita than once they did.The greater diversification of diet
has been advantageous to dairymen, market gardeners and fruit growers;
but the bulk of farmers have lost more than they have gained from the
changes.Americans have also been wearing less clothing than formerly,
and that hurts the market for cotton planters and wool growers.More-
over, there has been a shift from cotton and woolen fabrics toward silk
and rayon.Finally, the goods on which American families have spent880 RECENT ECONOMIC CHANGES
freely—automobiles and their accessories, gasoline, household furnishings
and equipment, radios, travel, amusements and sports—are goods in
which little agricultural produce is used.
To make matters harder, the firmness of wage rates in the flourishing
industries has forced farmers to pay relatively high wages for such hired
labor as they have needed.Taxes on farm property have risen in every
year covered by the record.While the prices farmers had to pay for
operating supplies and equipment, as well as for consumers' goods,
dropped sharply in 1921, they did not drop nearly so much as the prices
which farmers received for their products.Fluctuations in the two
sets of prices since 1921 have redressed the inequality only in part.26
It is a grave error to think of American farmers as the passive but
complaining victims of calamity.Chapter VIII shows that they have
exhibited as vigorous a capacity for self-help as any other large section
of the community.The qualities which enabled their forerunners to
subdue the wilderness reappear in the efforts of the present generation
to work a way out of the postwar tangle.
But agriculture is a business of very slow turnover.Agriculture
is also an extrahazardous business, which depends for results on averages
over a series of harvests.The dislocations it faces at present are partly
the result of continuing secular trends, rather than cyclical fluctuations
which reverse themselves every few years.And agriculture is a business
in which millions of producers are working each on his own account.A
concerted policy is exceedingly difficult to organize.What one farmer
does to help himself often makes matters harder for other farmers.That
is the aspect of the farm problem which requires attention here.
The individual farmer, hard pressed by low prices and high fixed
costs, has tried several ways to better his fortunes.One way alleviates
the lot of other farmers, whether it turns out well for himself or not.It
is to give up farming.Dr. C. J. Galpin estimates that there was a net
decrease of farm population amounting to 460,000 persons in 1922,
perhaps a larger number in 1923, 182,000 in 1924 when city jobs were
harder to get, and 479,000 in 1926. We have already noticed Dr. M. B.
Givens' estimate that in 1920—1927 upwards of a million migrants from the
farm sought other occupations.So far as reduction in number of
workers goes, there is a close parallel between the record of farming and
of manufacturing.27
26Seethe latest Department of Agriculture indexes in Chapter VIII, p. 548.
27Commentingupon this passage, Dr. E. G. Nourse suggests that this shrinkage
in the number of farm workers seems likely to continue.Agriculture bids fair
definitely and to lose numbers as a result of changes in technique.The
new branches of farming which are growing up take many less hands than are dis-
placed in the old staple lihes..Thus the industry as a giving up workers
to other callings?A REVIEW 881
Thisconsiderable shift in population has been accompanied by a
much slighter decline in the area of land cultivated.The abandonment
of poor farms has unquestionably been accelerated by hard times, though
we lack comprehensive data to show on what scale.On the other hand,
wide tracts of former waste lands have been reclaimed and wider tracts
of former cattle ranges have been brought under the plow.The net
outcome of these contrary movements is perhaps best shown by the
Department of Agriculture's report of the acreage in 19 principal crops.
From 351 million acres in 1919, the area declined unsteadily to 342
millions in 1924, rose above 350 millions in 1926, and then shrank by
three-quarters of a million acres in 1927.
But the smaller numbers of workers left on farms, cultivating slightly
less land, have increased their output—again paralleling developments
in manufacturing.The Department of Agriculture's index showing
"mass of crop production" mounted from 100 in 1919—a year of fair
harvests—to 102 in 1922, 104 in 1925, and 106 in 1927.If these figures
were reduced to a per-capita basis, the rate of increase would be decidedly
greater.Of course, every farmer who has enlarged his output has
contributed his mite toward keeping down prices.Agricultural depres-
sion had forced the individual farmer to meet his narrow margins above
cost by raising more units to sell, and selling more units has tended to
make these margins narrower still.
Increased productivity per worker in agriculture has been achieved
in the same way as increased productivity per worker in manufacturing—
by putting more intelligence into the work.For decades, agricultural
experiment stati9ns,colleges,state bureaus, farm papers, and the
Department of Agriculture in Washington have been actively seeking
to learn and to teach better methods of farming.From drainage to the
choice of crops, the breeding of stock and the building of fireplaces,
scarcely any feature of. farming as a technical process, as a business
enterprise, or as a way of making a home but has been studied intensively
and written up extensively.Slowly the lessons have been learned by an
increasing number of farmers and farmers' wives.The pressure of
hard times speeded. up the application of knowledge to practice, despite
the fact that hard times cut down the farmers' ability to accumulate the
capital which many of the changes require.
One of the conspicuous changes in methods of farming has reacted
most unfavorably upon the demand for farm products.The number of
tractors in use on farms is estimated to have increased from 80,000 in
January, 1918, to 380,000 in 1922, and 770,000. in January, 1928.This
change has been accompanied by a decrease in the number of horses
and mules on farms from abOut 26,400,000 in 1918 and 1919 to 20,100,000
in 1928.An even greater decline was occurring at the same. time in the
number of horses and mules in cities.A not inconsiderable branch: of882 RECENT ECONOMIC CHANGES
animal husbandry thus lost much of its market.What was worse, at
least 15 to 18 million acres of hay and grain land lost its market also.
To get a just impression of the versatility farmers have shown in
coping with their difficulties, one must turn back to the chapter on
agriculture, or even to the books there cited.That with all their courage
and ability they have not yet succeeded in regaining their fermer
of prosperity, must be ascribed partly to the slowness of
processes themselves, partly to the halting recuperation of Europe and
its reactions on other countries, and partly to the fact that increasing
efficiency has added to the supply •f farm products or cut down the
demand.
Agricultural depression has not been confined to the United States.
In many other countries, the tillers of the soil have been engaged in a
similar struggle with unfavorable conditions of supply and demand.
Their efforts to make up for the relatively low prices received for their
products by marketing larger quantities, and their compulsory retrench-
ments o( expenditure, have reaôted unfavorably upon the fortunes of
American farmers, just as the similar actions of American farmers have
made conditions harder for them.Round a good part of the globe, the
productivity of agriculture has been rising, while in most of the leading
industrial nations other branches of production have grown slowly if
at all.The effect upon prices in the great world markets has been
striking.The demand for agricultural products as a whole is i:aelastic
compared with the demand for many industrial products.That is, a
relatively small increase in the current supply of foodstuffs, the great
agricultural staple,, brings a relatively large decline in market prices.
Hence the change intheinternational balance of agricultural and non-
agricultural output has created a difficult situation for farmers, even in
the few countries, like the United States, where production in other lines
has increased rapidly.
What has been the net effect of all the factors, domestic and foreign,
influencing the economic fortunes of American farmers, is hard to ascer-
tain.The preceding chapters on agriculture and on national income
present the facts from various angles.That is desirable; for no simple
summary of.so complicated a situation can be adequate.But perhaps
the following figures, which purport to show the changing relations
between the average per capita incomes of farmers and of the whole
population, are as significant as any which might be chosen.
Though the estimates from which these percentages. are drawn
(columns 10 and 11 of Table 12 in Chap. XII) are the best results our
investigators have been able to get from the. available data, they are
subject to an uncertain margin of error.That the figures differ in
certa'in respects from what most people, including our investigators
themselves, would expect to find is not seriously disturbing; for expecta-AREVIEW 883
tions in such matters are notoriously biased by cases which have
impressed our minds because of their striking character.
TABLE9.—ESTIMATEDPER CAPITA INCOMES OF AMERICAN FARMERS AS PERCENTAGES
OF ESTIMATED PER CAPITA INCOMES OF THE TOTAL POPULATION, IN VARIOUS YEARS




























On the face of these returns, American farmers gained greatly in
relative economic status between the beginning .andthe end of the
war,, though, even at their peak, agricultural incomes.per capita remained
far below the national average.The catastrophic drop from 1919 to
1921 wiped out all of this gain and considerably more.If our estimates
are reliable, by 1925 farmers had won back to their prewar position in
comparison with average per capita incomes, in other occupations, but
they were by no means so well off as in 19 19—20.Unfortunately, the data
for similar computations in years since 1925 are not yet available.
Even if these results be accepted as probably more reliable than
general impressions, they do not represent adequately the farmer's
relative position in the national economy.In particular, they show
nothing of the financial entanglements into which many of the most
enterprising American farmers were drawn in the flush years.A man
may make as good a current income now as before the war and still be
far worse off, if he is carrying a greatly increased load of debts.And
quite apart from that, the not unfavorable income comparison which
1925 makes with prewar years is due to the use of shrinking per capita
figures for farmers and swelling per capita figures for the total population.
An industry which keeps up its per capita quota of the national income
because thousands of workers withdraw from it cannot be regarded as
flourishing.
VII. THE INTERRELATIONS AMONG ECONOMIC CHANGES
The Factors Already Discussed.—So far, the contrasts noted at the
outset of this chapter between the economic fortunes of different income
groups, different industries, and different sections of the United States in
1922—1927, have been traced to three factors—or rather to three great
complexes of factors.(1) Foreign conditions on the whole have been
none too favorable to American business, and they have been eminently884 RECENT ECONOMIC CHANGES
unfavorable to American agriculture.Important branches of industry
have enjoyed a large increase in foreign sales; but had Europe been
prosperous, American prosperity would have been less "spotty" and more
intense.28•(2) Such prosperity as we have enjoyed has been earned by
many-sided and strenuous efforts, in which millions of people have shared,
to improve our technical methods, our business management, our trade-
union policy, and our Government administration.(3) While increasing
efficiency has added to real income, it has put pressure, often :rising to
severe hardship, upon competitors, direct and indirect.The factory
hand competing with the "automatic" machine, the horse farmer
competing with the tractor farmer, the lumber industry competing with
the cement industry, the New England cotton mill competing with the
North Carolina cotton mill, the independent retailer competing with the
chain store, the clothing trade competing with the makers of automobiles
and radios for slices of the consumers' dollars, have had a hard time.
This analysis is not simple, but it is still too schematic.There is
no hope of learning and telling the whole story in realistic detail.Yet
•one further factor of great moment and two sets of "economic reactions"
must be introduced before a summing up is attempted.
Retardation in the Growth of Population and Its Effects.—The
additional factor to be taken into account concerns population growth.
In sketching the main lines of nineteenth-century it was
noted that the fruits of the tree of applied knowledge can be consumed in
several ways.One way is to increase population as fast as the tree
increases its yield.If that course is pushed to the limit, there can be no
reduction of working hours and no advance in the standard of living.
The latter gains are contingent upon keeping the growth of population
slower than the gain in productive efficiency.And before the close of
the century the European stock had sensibly reduced its birth rate.
This reduction of birth rates has been going on during our period in
most of the states of the Union.The decline seems to be more rapid
than the decline in death rates.Moreover, first the war and then legis-
lation restricted immigration.The chapter on labor sums up the results
in the following way:
28Oncemore the reader is reminded that this summary deals only with broad
features.Important details, passed by in silence here, are brought out in the pre-
ceding chapters.A REVIEW 885
Net immigrationAverage per into the United
States year
Prewar period
July1,1907—June, 30, 1914 4,645,590
War and early postwar period
July 1, 1914—June 30, 1921 I1,253,652
Qtiota-restrictionperiod




Combined, the birth-rate and death-rate changes and the changes in
migration reduced the average annual increase of population from
1,800,000 in 1920—1925 to 1,545,000 in 1925—1928.
The retardation in population growth has .affectedthe whole social
situation profoundly in ways which concern the student of sociology and
politics quite as deeply as they concern the economist.It will be long
before the full effects upon national life become clear.But certain
prompt economic consequences must be noted.
At the close of the war, when a fall in the price level like that of 1865
was expected by many, business executives frequently said that the first
task of reorganization. was to "liquidate labor."The. great buying
campaign of 1919 and the accompanying uprush of prices caused a
postponement of this program.For a it was hard to .getmen
enough, even at rising rates.When prices fell preciptiously in 1920—21
and unemployment was rife, the moment to insist on wage reductions
seemed to have come.But the trade unions offered strenuous resistance,
despite the number, of the temporarily idle.Their resistance was more
effective than it could have been had not the growth of population been
retarded for some years.The prices of labor were cut, to be sure, but
not cut as much as the prices of consumers' goods.Hence, when employ-
ment became tolerably full again toward the close of 1922, wage earners
found themselves in. ,possession of relatively large purchasing power.
Then the economic.advantages of a broad consumers' market began to
appear.Employers discovered that their' inability to "liquidate labor"
had been fortunate for themselves, as well as for their employees.The
doctrine of high wages found conspicuous champions among the business
leaders,and their formulations favored its spread.Discoveries in
science, as well as in practical life, have often been made thus .by observ-
ing the consequences. of a thwarted effort. '
Inmost periods of prosperity, wage rates lag somewhat behind living
costs on the rise.The indications are that these paradoxical "prosperity
losses" to wage earners have not cut much figure during 1922—1927.
Wholesale prices have sagged slightly, and living costs have advanced886 RECENT ECONOMiC CHANGES
but little.Though the percentage of unemployment has risen since
1923, wage rates have been firmly maintained on the whole, if not
increased somewhat.
This result also must be ascribed in part to the relatively slow increase
in the number of job hunters.Had there been no legal check on immi-
gration in 1922—1927, unemployment would have attained large pro-
portions, and the difficulty of maintaining wage rates would have been
greater.
Moreover, it seems sound to ascribe a part of the gains in technical
efficiency, which have been so characteristic of recent years, to the high
price of labor.An employee to whom one pays high wages may repre-
sent low labor cost.But if he is to be so efficient as to be cheap, he must
be provided with good equipment and aided by good management.
More horse power per man and better management per man, to twist
Mr. Dennison's flexible phrase, are needed to secure more production
per man; and more production must be had per man when mo:re wages
are paid per man.
All this discussion on a per capita basis is proper; to make clear how
proper, consider the effect of retardation in population growth upon
aggregate production and wealth.Had there been no reduction in birth
rates and no restriction of immigration, the United States would. contain
several millions more people than it does.As large or a larger fraction
of the greater population would be "engaged in gainful occupations,"
and, despite more unemployment and a less advanced stage of industrial
technique, the workers would probably be producing a greater volume
of goods.Thus, the national income would be rising faster than it is;
but per capita income would be growing slower than it is.Sinee birth-
rate restriction seems to be voluntary, and since immigration restriction
certainly is, we must conclude that Americans are preferring to raise
the economic level of average life rather than to maximize national
wealth.
Mutually Moderating and Mutually Intensifying Reactions.—The
two sets of economic reactions still to be noted may be thought of as the
mutually moderating effects of factors opposing each other, and as the
mutually intensifying effects of factors working in the same direction.
Like the set of economic reactions already discussed—the pressure
exerted on competitors by those who increase their own efficiency—these
moderating and intensifying effects arise from the basic feature of eco-
nomic organization.Though modern society accepts the principle of
individual responsibility, each individual gets his money income wholly
by serving others, and gets his real income mainly by consuming goods
other people have made.Thus everyone depends both on the buying
power of other consumers and on the efficiency of other producers.And
what is true of every individual is true, mutatis mutandis, of every businessA REVIEW 887
enterprise.These intricate relations of interdependence tangle the skein
of economic causes and effects beyond the present power of man to
unravel.Every development is the net resultant of numerous causes
and also the cause of numerous effects.But though we can not disen-
tangle all the crisscrossing influencesthe factors which have shaped
American fortunes in 1922—1927, we can follow certain of their salient
reactions upon each other.
To take first the moderating effects of opposing factors: Ameri-
can prosperity in 1922—1927, in nonagricultural lines, would have been
decidedly greater had the six million American farmers been flourishing.
Every man thrown out of work has subtracted an iota from the national
dividend, and an iota from the demand for goods.Every business that
has failed has made a tiny difference in our ability to provide for our
wants and to market our products.The United States as a whole would
have been better off if all foreign countries had enjoyed fortunes equal
to its own.
On the other hand, the farmers would have been in far worse plight
if the majority of Americans had not been receiving relatively large
incomes, and if American factories and railways had not been highly
efficient as servants of agriculture.So too, the unemployed would have
been more numerous, and their difficulties in getting new jobs greater,
had the country suffered from industrial depression.Finally, other
countries would have been worse off, had we not been in position to
import freely, and to make large loans.
There can be no doubt about the reality or the importance of these
reactions of hardship in diminishing prosperity, and of prosperity in
diminishing hardship.But there seems to be no way of measuring such
complicated influences with the data available.
Clearer still are the effects of one favorable development in reinforcing
other favorable developments, and the, corresponding intensification of
misfortune by misfortune.In this period and in our country, the former
set of cumulations has been more in evidence than the latter.And it
is necessary to bring these reactions of favorable developments upon
each other into the foreground of our final picture.For we cannot
understand any single factor in the situation, such as increasing techno-
logical efficiency, the rising standard of living, the relatively stable price
level, the large volume of construction, the abundance of capital and
credit, or large income disbursements, without noting how other factors
favored its development..
Take, for example, keener intelligence applied to the day's work,
which increased the physical output of goods.That has meant the
possibility of larger average real incomes per capita.To distribute
these goods, market experts cultivated the desires of the people for a
freer and more varied consumption; they developed plans by which the888 RECENT ECONOMIC CHANGES
eager could satisfy wants before they could pay.A sound monetary
and banking system provided the requisite currency and credit to run
this whole process of producing and distributing a swelling river of goods.
Price fluctuations were held within narrow limits by a combination of
prudence among business men, unit-cost reductions by technical experts,
skill on the part of bankers, and the course of foreign markets.This
relative stability of prices reinforced the pressure upon all parties to
exercise caution, calculate closely, and watch costs; it also helped to
keep world prices relatively stable.Since prices were not buoyant,
business enterprises had to maintain a high level of efficiency in order
to make profits, and that fact intensified the application of intelligence
with which this paragraph started.By the aid of the reinforced effi-
ciency, it has been possible to pay high wages and salaries, meet interest
and rental charges, distribute liberal dividends, and still retain large
surpluses for protecting or expanding business ventures.The large
income disbursements provided the purchasing power to which the market
experts appealed for the purchase of the increased physical output of
goods.Meanwhile, the considerable profits reaped by the large number
of efficient enterprises made them eager to grow.At the same time,
prosperous families, wanted better housing; prosperous communities
wanted larger schools; prosperous states wanted hard-surfaced roads.
So the routine business of providing current income was supplemented
by an exceptional volume of new construction to provide industrial
equipment of all kinds, office buildings, single dwellings, apartments,
hotels, theaters, schools and highways.That required capital running
into billions of dollars.The demand was met without strain from the
surpluses of business enterprises and the savings of individuals whose
higher standards of living had not absorbed all of their money incomes.
And of course the construction work, as it proceeded, enlarged the market
for a vast variety of goods, and enlarged the disbursements of income.
So one might go on indefinitely, tracing the fashion in which each of
the prosperity-producing factors in the situation has increased the
activity out of which it grew, and thus promoted conditions which
heightened its own efficiency.The broad facts, however, are patent.
And no elaboration would lead to a convincing evaluation of what credit
belongs to any single factor taken by itself.Drop out any of the develop-
ments recalled in the preceding paragraph, and the process as a whole
would be altered.It is just as impossible to say what high wages, large
construction, skillful marketing, railroad efficiency, or abundant credit
contributed to prosperity, as it is to say how much agricultural depres-
sion, technological unemployment, or the lingering troubles of Europe
have diminished the prosperity which might have been attained but
for these drawbacks.A I?EVIEW 889
Net Effects upon. Average Per Capita Income.—Reasons were given
above for accepting the estimate of per capita income, expressed in
dollars of constant purchasing power, as the most inclusive, and probably
the most reliable, summary of the net results flowing from all the myriad
changes which affect the economic welfare of the country's people.
Accordingly, we return to these figures as the best general conclusion of
the whole investigation.Two series of figures are given.The first
shows income received in money; the second "disbursed income "—that
is, money receipts plus the value of income yielded by homes occupied
by their owners and by household goods, the value of farm produce
consumed by the producers and minor items of similar nature.The first
series corresponds closely to the common conception of income, but the
other is a better index of economic welfare.The following comments
refer to the second series.29















Fromthe trough in which the war and the war-dominated cycle of
1919—1921 left the country, Americans raised their average fortunes
to the prewar level in a single year of reviving activity.A second year
of great gains left the old records far behind.Since 1923, progress has
been steady, but less rapid.
Unless these figures are very far in error, not only absolutely but also
relatively, the final verdict upon the years 1922—1926, and presumably
upon 1927 and 1928, for which the income record 'is yet incomplete,
Thedifference between income received in money and disbursed income appears
to be decreasing rapidly in relation to total income, with some indications of an
absolute decrease as well.Presumably this change is explained, in part, by the
increasing percentage of the population that lives iii rented quarters.—Note by
M. C. Rorty, Director.890 RECENT ECONOMIC CHANGES
must be that they brought good times to the majority of our people—
though by no means to.all.
VIII. BUSINESS CYCLES IN 1921—1927
The Question whether Business Cycles Have Been "Ironed Out."—
A final characteristic of the last few years in the United States is the
relative stability of business.It is not by oversight that little is said
about business cycles in the preceding chapters.In statistical parlance,
the conspicuous feature Of recent economic changes is the rising trend in
output perworker and average income, rather than cyclical fluctuations.
The United States has not had a genuine in business at large
since 1919; it has not had a "commercial crisis" since 1920, or a severe
depressionsince1921.Violent contrasts of economic fortune are
found; but they run side by side in different industries.Violent changes
in certain activities have occurred from year to year; but they have been
localized industrially or geographically, like the rise and collapse of the
Florida land speculation.Even the "bull market" on the New York.
Stock Exchange, which has reached such heights in 1928—29, seems not
to have infected business in commodities.For the country as a whole,
both current opinions and statistical indexes indicate that production,
transportation and distribution have been maintained for the 'last few
years on a high, but not exceedingly high, level, with brief periods of
contraction, to which the term "depression" seems scarcely applicable.
This relative stability has encouraged optimists to say that "the
business cycle" has been "ironed out" in the United States; that oul'
last cycle ended in 1921, and that we need not fear a serious reaction in
the future.The forecast in this statement we may leave for the future
to test, reserving our attention to what has already happened.
The validity of the optimistic view depends on the meaning attached
to the term "business cycles."If no fluctuation in economic activity
be counted a cycle unless it includes a boom, crisis, and severe depression—
as these vague terms are commonly understood—then it is true that the
United States has had no business cycle since 19 19—1921.But on that
interpretation, "the business cycle" was "ironed àut" in the United
States before the war.From 1909 to 1913 the oscillations in general
business activity were notably moderate.Nor was that the first stretch
of rather uneventful business years either in this country or elsewhere, as
Dr. Willard L. Thorp's collection of Business Annals shows.However, a
discussion of recent changes in business cycles is of little use when con-
ducted in such vague terms.NOt unless the amplitudes of successive
cycles can be measured and compared, •is it possible to reach definite
conclusions.
How This Question Can Be Answered.—For some time the National
Bureau has been engaged in making such measurements.ThoughA REVIEW 891
designed for a larger purpose, they can be applied to the present problem.
All the statistical series representing changes in economic activities by
months or quarters, for as many years as possible, are being collected for
several countries and analyzed on a uniform plan, to find how they behave
business cycles.From these materials we may select the leading
American series which cover several prewar cycles, add a few especially
significant series covering a briefer period, and arrange the measurements
to answer the question in hand.
The first step, in measuring the amplitudes of cyclical fluctuations in
statistical series, is to fix a set of "reference dates" marking the beginning,
peak, and ending of the generaL business cycles in each country dealt
with.These dates show the year and month of successive cyclical
revivals and recessions.They are determined roughly by a study of
business annals and made more precise by a study of what statistical
data are available from case to case.(2) Each series is then broken into
"reference-cycle segments" on the basis of the reference dates.(3)
The- average value of a series during each reference-cycle segment is
computed, and the original data are turned into percentages of these
averages as 100.This use of percentages, or relatives, makes it possible
tcompare the fluctuations of the same series in different cycles and of
different series in the same cycle.It eliminates the greater part of the
secular trends of the series, but retains what may be called the "intra-
cycle trends."(4) The relatives are examined to see whether they show
appreciable seasonal variations.If so, the seasonals are determined and
eliminated by methods which need not be described.After this step has
been taken, a series is in shape to have its cyclical behavior measured in
various ways.
The measurements of present concern relate to the amplitude of the
rise from the early trough in a cycle to the peak, and of the fall from the
peak to the subsequent trough.Such figures. are given in Table 12.
Though the basic chronology is furnished by the list of reference dates,
the low, high, low turning points given in the table are those found in the
several series.Most series lead or lag behind the revivals and recessions
in general business.To diminish the influence of random fluctuations,
we use three-months averages centered, instead of actual standings in
the single months when a series touches its peak or trough.
The Duration of Prewar and Postwar Cycles in General Business.—
Before examining this table in detail, it is well to see how recent business
cycles in the United States compare with their predecessors in respect to
duration.Table 11, giving the reference dates used in marking off
cycles in general business activity over a period of 73 years, provides the
necessary data.
Of course, there is an element of the arbitrary in fixing the beginning
and end of these cycles so definitely as the table pretends to do..in892 RECENT ECONOMIC CHANGES
dealing with a single series, one commonly, though not invariably, finds
clearly marked cyclical turning points.But in a collection of different
series these points never all fall in the same month.Yet some month
within the period when most series touch bottom and turn up, or reach
the peak and turn down, must be selected as a marker, even though its
claim to represent the turn of the general tide may be no better
than that of several neighboring months.The uncertainty which
month to select is greatest when business continues active or dull on much
the same level for a considerable time before it declines or rises.One of
the difficult problems presented by the whole list of reference dates
in Table 11 is when to date the recession in the latest cycle covered.
November 1926, was finally fixed upon, though almost equally good cases
can be made out for several other months ranging from April 1925, when
wholesale prices began receding from their peak, to March 1927, when the
operating revenues of railroads began to decline.Our practice in such
cases is to choose a date as near the end of the nearly level stretch as the
data justify.
TABLE 11.—STANDARD REFERENCE DATES FOR BUSINESS CYCLES, UNITED STATES
Expansion Contraction Duration in months










January1855 to June 1857 July 1857 toDecember185830 18 48
January1859 to October1860 November 1860 toJune 1861 22 8 30
July 1861 to April 1865 May 1865 toDecember186746 32 78
January1868 to June 1869 July 1869 toDecember1870 18 18 36
January1871 to October1873 November 1873 toMarch 187934 65 99
April 1879 to March 1882 April 1882 toMay 188536 38 74
June 1885 to March 1887 April 1887 toApril 188822 13 35
May 1888 to July 1890 August1890 toMay 1891 27 10 37
June 1891 to January1893 February1893 toJune 189420 17 37
July 1894 to December1895 January1896 toJune 1897 18 18 36
July 1897 to June 1899 July 1899 toDecember1900 24 18 42
January1901 to September1902 October1902 toAugust 1904 21 23 44
September 1904 to May 1907 June 1907 toJune 1908 33 13 46
July 1908 to January 1910 February1910 toJanuary1912 19 24 43
February1912 to January 1913 February1913 toDecember1914 12 23 35
January1915 to August 1918 September 1918toApril 1919 44 8 52
May 1919 to January 1920 February1920 toSeptember1921 9 20 29
October1921 to May 1923 June 1923 toJuly 1924 20 14 34
August 1924 to October 1926 November 1926 toDecember1927 27 14 41
Average duration
19 cycles, 1855 to 1927 25.420.746.1
13 cycles, 1885 to 1927 22.816.539.3
Accepting these decisions, we find certain peculiarities in the duration
of recent cycles.(1) The World-War cycle brought a period of activityA REVIEW 893
exceeded in length only by the expansion phase of the Civil-War cycle.
The subsequent contraction lasted only eight months, and is matched in
brevity only by the, contraction which preceded the Civil War.These
two segments produce the longest full cycle the country has experienced
in a generation, though it falls far short of three earlier cycles covered
by the table.(2) The first postwar cycle was correspondingly brief—29
months as against 52.Its period of expansion was the shortest in the
record, less than a third of the full cycle.On the average, the phase of
expansion lasts appreciably longer than the phase of contraction.(3) The
cycle of 1921—1924 represented a return toward the average duration
and the average relations of the two phases.But it still fell five months
short of the average for full cycles since 1885—a more representative
figure for current experience than the average which includes the Civil
War and the prolonged depression of the 1870's.(4) A still closer
return to the average appears in the last cycle.The reference dates
make it 41 months long, or 1.7 months longer than the preferred average.
The prosperous phase is an unusually large fraction of the whole; but,
as said above, the date for recession in this case is hard to fix.
So far as durations go, then, business cycles have reverted to type
after the aberrations of the war.Of course that historical fact does not
justify anyone in counting upon 40-month cycles in the near future,
for the table shows that cycle lengths are "subject to change with-
out notice."
Conformity of Different Activities to the Standard Cyclical Pat-
tern.—If business cycles are in process of being "ironed out," as. time
passes we shall find an increasing number of series which do not undergo
cyclical Twenty series are included in Table 12.How
many of them show all the recessions in recent years which Table 11
shows for general business?And what series depart from this standard
pattern?The answers may be given in schedule form.
Ten. series conform to the standard cyclicaL pattern throughout the period since
1914.
One series (interest rates on commercial paper) passed through two cycles during
the war, but has conformed closely since 1919.
Two series (bank clearings outside of New York City and liabilities of bankrupt
concerns) skipped the, mild recessionthe end of the war, but have conformed closely
since 1921.
One series (exports of merchandise) has only three cycles since 1914, instead of
the standard number four.But this series did not conform with regularity before the
war, presumably because the volume of merchandise which the United States can
sell abroad depends more upon business conditions in foreign countries than upon
business conditions at home.
Three series (the index number of farm prices of crops, cattle and hog receipts at
Chicago) have the standard number of cycles, but the dates of their turning points
are erratic.Such is the usual case with agricultural series, for the weather changes
which exert such an influence upon farm prices, fodder crops arid the marketing of894 RECENTECONOMIC CHANGES
stock, seldom run a course parallel to general business activity for several years in
succession.
Three series skipped the cyclical decline of coal production,
dividend disbursements by industrial corporations, and number of shares sold on
the New York Stock Exchange.Hog receipts had turned downward in 1923 and
cattle receipts in December, 1924.All the other series in our sample, 15 out of 20,
suffered a fall beginning in some month between April 1925 and March 1927.
The test here applied to determine whether the behavior of a given
series conforms to the standard cyclical pattern is rather exacting.
Unless a series rises within the• period labeled expansion in Table 11,
and falls within the period labeled contraction, it is set down as failing
in conformity. A change in this practice will be called for if the effort
to smooth out business cycles succeeds gradually.For in smoothing
out these cycles the stage should come when alternating phases of
expansion and contraction will be reduced to alternating accelerations and
retardations of a rising secular trend.A cycle will remain; but it will
be so attenuated that the statistician will have to measure it in varying
rates of increase, not in plus and minus items.Even now such measure-
ments are useful.They prove that general business conditions exercise
some influence upon processes which skip cyclical declines.If the
measurements in Table 12 were made into average rates of change per
month, they would show a higher degree of conformity to the standard
cyclical pattern than is credited here.But so long as fundamental
business factors,like employment, bank clearings, wholesale prices,
physical production, new construction, and railroad revenues continue
to exhibit actual declines, we have not attained the acceleration-retarda-
tion stage.What progress toward that stage can we. claim?
The Amplitudes of Prewar, War and Postwar Business Cycles.—
A sharp picture of each of the last five cycles in the United States, against
a background of prewar experience, can be drawn from the amplitude
entries .in Table 12.Thirteen of the twenty serIes cover seven or more
prewar cycles, and conform passably in timing to most or to all of the
standard reference cycles since 1914.
(1) In the last prewar cycle, February 1912 to December 1914, the
amplitude of the rise was relatively slight.Imports and immigration
are the only series among the thirteen which rose more than the prewar
average.
The contraction promised for a time to have the same gentle char-
acter; but it was aggravated by the outbreak of the war in July 1914;
Even so, the amplitude of the fall failed to reach the prewar average in
seven of the thirteen series.Of course male immigration from the
belligerent countries was severely checked by the call to the colors; that
is the only series in which the decline was much greater than usual..
All in all, the cycle was exceptionally mild.
(2) In the war cycle, January 1915 to April 1919, the rise exceeded
the prewar average, except in anthracite coal shipments, immigration,A REVIEW
No cyclical decline since 1925.
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TABLE 12.—AMPLITUDE OF THE CYCLICAL FLUCTUATIONS
TIME SERIES DURING AND POSTWAR
The amplitudes are expressed in percentage8 of the average value of
cycle.Seasonal variations are eliminated.
IN LEADING AMERICAN
BUsINEss CYCLES
a series during each business
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12.—AMPLITUDEOF THE CYCLICAL FLUCTUATIONS IN LEADING 'AMERICAN
TIME SERIES DURING PREWAR, WAR AND PàSTWAR BUSINESS CYCLES
(Continued)









Cattle receipts at Chicago.
Prewar cycles.Average of 15 65.140. 75.61.137.2
Last prewar cycle July '12Apr. '13 Nov. '1495116 21 6485
War cyc'e Jan. '15 Sept. '18 Mar. '1942148 10648154
Postwar cycles Apr. '19Dec.'19 July '2196126 30 51 81
Aug. '21Apr. '23 Nov. '2376120 44 3983
Dec. '23Dec. '24 Nov. '2581115 34 27 61
Live hog receipt8 at Chicago.
Prewar cycles.Average of 12 55.8 144.6 67.4 88.8 77.2 166.0
Last prewar cycle Jan. '13 Sept.'13 Nov. '1487141 71 54 70124
War cycle Dec. '14Oct. '16 Sept. '1761140 5979 81160
Postwar cycles Oct. '17 Mar. '18Apr.'2057138 638175156
May '20 Aug. '21Feb. '2267124 8857 36 93
Mar. '22July '23Feb. '2780148 6968 79147
Wholesaleprices.Bureauof
Labor Statistics index number
for all commodities.
Prewar cycles.Averageof7 94.7 106.4 98.8 11.77.8 19.5
Last prewar cycle June'11 Sept. '13Dec. '149510398 8 5 13
War cycle Jan. '15 Sept. '18Feb. '196313312670 7 77
Postwar cycles Mar. '19 May'20 Jan. '22971247027 54 81
Feb.'22 Apr.'23 June'2492106 96 14 10 24
July '24 Mar. '25 May'2796105 94 9 11 20
Farm price of crops index.De-
partmentof Agriculture.
Prewarcycles.Average of 2 89.0 115.5 85.0 26.5 30.5 57.0
Lastprewar cycle June '11 June '12July '1386120 8334 37 71
War cycles Aug. '13 Mar. '15 Sept. '1582110 9228 18 46
Oct.'15 Mar.'18 July'1859143116 8427111
Postwar cycles... Aug.'18 June'20 July'2198145 47 47 98145
Aug.'21Aug. '25 May'2783115 953220 52
Operating revenuesofClassI
railroads.
Prewar cycles.Average of 2 79109 9430 1545
Last prewar cycle Feb. '12 May'13 Nov. '1488109 87 21 22 43
War cycle Dec. '14 Aug. '18 Mar. '196614211876 24100
Postwar cycles Apr. '19 Sept. '20Jan. '2281119 8938 3068
Feb. '22 May'23 Aug.'248711896 2920 49
Sept. '24Feb. '27Dcc. '279010790 17 1734
Bank clearings outsideofNew
York.Daily average.
Prewar cycles.Average of 10 76.8 115.94.8 38.7 20.7 59.4
Last prewar cycle May'11 Jan. '13 Nov. '148811090 22 2042
War cycle Dec. '14 Sept. '20 May'2147157100110 58167
Postwar June'21 May '23 June'2477113105 36 8 44
July'24 Dec. '25Jan. '278110597 24 7 32
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ofcyclical turning Standing at Amplitudes of
points cyclical turning cyclical
points fluctuations
Rise LastFirst LastRiseFalland High low low low fall
Bank clearings in New York City.
Daily average?
Prewar cycles.Average of 16.. . . . .67.2137.676.170.481.6 132.0
Last prewar cycle May '11Oct. '12 Sept. '1486121 6435 5792
War cycle Oct. '14Dec. '16 Mar. '1837 948629115
Postwar cycles Apr. '18 Mar. '20Oct. '2166120 78544296
Nov. '21 Mar. '23 Sept. '2380110 8630 24 54
Oct. '23 Mar. '26 Nov. '2683118 8935 29 64
Buildingpermitsissued,total
values.Bradetreet's.
Prewar cycles.Average of 2 62123 756148109
Last prewar cycle Mar. '11June '12Dec. '1480124 654459103
War cycle Jan. '15July '16Dec.'1876175 34101144245
Postwar cycles Jan. '19Jan. '20Dec. '2017141 6412577202
Jan. '21Feb. '24July '2434157 9012367190
Aug. '24Oct. '26July'2772124 79524597
Total exports of merchandise.
Prewar cycles.Average of 10 71.7 129.9 88.6 58.2 43.3 101.5
Last prewar cycle Sept.'08 Nov. '12 Aug. '146613966 7373146
War cycle Sept. '14 June'17 Nov. '1728168106142 62204
Postwar cycles Dec. '17 June '19Dec. '2175193 45118148266
Jan. '22 Mar. '25Dec. '276712096 53 2477
Total imports of merchandise.
Prewar cycles.Average of 12 78.3 125 184.5 46.7 40.6 87.3
Last prewar cycle May'11 Dec. '13Jan. '15781317853 53106
War cycle Feb.'15 May'18 June'195514413689 8 97
Postwar cycles July'19 July '20July '2184160 5376107183
Aug. '21 Mar. '23Aug. '24741289454 3488
Sept. '24Jan. '26Dec. '27761159439 16 55
Interestratesoncommercial
paper.NewYork City.
Prewarcycles.Average of 17 71.7 145.671 573.9 74 0 147.9
Last prewar cycle Dec. '11 June'13 Mar. '1471135 76 6459123
War cycles Apr. '14 Sept. '14Apr. '1697155 75 5880138
May'16 Sept.'18Feb.'1992138114 462470
Postwar cycles.. Mar. '19 Aug. '20 Aug. '2275123 604863111
Sept. '22 Nov. '23Oct. '2486111 68 254368
Nov. '24Oct. '26 Nov. '278011197 31 1445
Dividend payments by industrial
corporations.
Prewarcycles.Average of 3 54.0 131.0 68.7 77.0 62 3139.3
Last prewar cycle Jan. '11Apr. '13Dec. '1440119 71 79 48127
War cycle Jan. '15 June'17 Aug.'1952 97105 60165
Postwar cycles Sept. '19 May'20 June'229911287 13 2538











Number of shares sold on the New
York Stock Exchange.
Prewarcycles.Averageof8 49.8172.9 44,5123.1128.4251.5
Last prewar cycle May 'iiSept. '11Dec. '146912026 51 94145
War cycle Jan. '15Nov. '16Aug. '1812211 51199160359













No cyclical decline since 1924.









Prewar cycles.Average of8 250.949.5268.0201.4218.5419.9
Last prewar cycle Feb. '11
War cycle July '14


































which was held at a low level by Euro
paper rates, which were affected by
Reserve System and the huge imports of
employment scored an exceptional gain.
advances appear in prices and "dollar series."The increases
production, while above the average, were less striking.
The decline of 1918—19 exceeded the prewar average in
which include the American Telephone and Telegraph
Index of General Business, factory employment, anthracite
immigration (which does not fit, the reference dates well in
and number of shares sold.In the remaining eight series, the decline was
less than usual.As noted above, outside clearings and liabilities of
failures show no cyclical contraction at all in 1918—19.
Thus the war cycle was characterized by a prolonged advance to
very high levels, particularly marked in prices and dollar values, followed
by a brief and moderate reaction.
(3) The first postwar cycle, May 1919 to September 1921, started
from a relatively high point, because the precedingcontractionhad been
so moderate.When a fresh expansion began in May 1919, it was not
possible to make large percentage gains in many lines.But wholesale
12.—AMPLITUDE OF
TIME SERIES DURING
THE CYCLICAL FLUCTUATIONS IN LEADING AMERICAN
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prices, imports,. and. number of shares sold (the one series which had
fallen heavily in 1918—19) surpassed their average prewar rises.
The contraction was violent.Not merely wholesale prices, but
also most of the "dollar series," employment, pig iron output, and shares
sold fell much more than they had Iallen in the average prewar cycle.
Less than.average declines occurred Only in anthracite coal, cattle receipts,
commercial-paper rates, and New York clearings.Each of. these excep-
tional cases. has a special explanation.
In summary, this cycle presents a advance from a level.
left high by the preceding contraction, followed b.y a crash of values.
On the, basis of prewar experience, a bank suspension was on the cards.
The Federal Reserve System proved its strength. by averting that
catastrophe.
(4) In the second postwar cycle, October 1921 to July 1924, recovery
from the low points touched in 1921 constituted a fair cyclical advance
without the attainment of high levels.And not a few industries did
have a brief season of exceptional activity in the early monthè of 1923.
In our sample of thirteen series, six rose more than their prewar averages
and seven rose less.
The contraction presents a similar picture.Six series fell more
than the prewar average, seven fell less.With two exceptions, the series
which rose little were the series which fell little and vice versa.Anthracite
coal had a less than average rise and a more than average fall, while
imports had a more than average fall and a less than average rise.
In amplitude as well as in duration, then, the cycle of 192 1—1924
marks a return tO the familiar type.Before the war it would have ranked
as an average case, save that the recession from the peak was attended
by less than the usual banking strain.
(5). The latest completed cycle in American business, August 1924
to December 1927, is quite different in character.On the rise, only one
series in our list (the American Telephone and Telegraph Company's
Index of General Business) exceeds its prewar average, and that' excess
is confined to the decimal column.All the other series which permit the
comparison show a subaverage advance.
On the decline two series, industrial employment and wholesale
prices, exceed their prewar averages.All the others shrink less than
usual or not, at all.
Adding together the cyclical rise and the cyclical fall, we find that
wholesale prices is the only series with a total swing exceeding its prewar
average.That average is19.5 points.The• corresponding figure in
1924—1927 is 20 points.
Compared with. prewar averages, then, the cycle which ended in
1927 was a mild affair.It still looks mild, if tried by severer standards.
We found the last prewar cycle to have 'been notably moderate.Yet900 RECENT ECONOMIC CHANGES
only one series in our list (wholesale prices again) had a larger rise and
fall in 1924—1927 than in 1912—1914.Alltheother series in Table 12,
which permit the comparison, make the latest cycle even milder than the
last cycle before the war.
To find prewar precedents for cyclical fluctuationsslight as those
of 1924—1927, we must resort to the cycle-by-cycle record of each series.
For more than half of the list, we can find one or more prewar cases
when the cyclical decline was smaller than in 1926—27.But Table 13,
which presents this comparison, shows that these individual cases are
scattered through eight different cycles.For three of the thirteen series,
prewar experience, as recorded in statistics, contains no match in mildness
for the latest decline.And two more series show no cyclical decline in
the last few years.
TABLE 13.—CYCLICAL DECLINES IN THE BUSINESS CYcLE OF 1924-4927COMPARED
WITH THE SMALLEST CYCLICAL DECLINES FOUND IN ANY PREWAR CYCLE
COVERED BY THE AVAILABLE STATISTICS
13 American series covering 7 or more prewar cycles, arranged in order of their cyclical declines in
1924—1927.
The amplitudes are stated in percentages of the average value of the series during the cycle referred to.






















Bank clearings in New York City
Exports
Imports
Interest rates on commercial paper....
Index of General Business. American
Telephone & Telegraph Company...
IndexofIndustrialEmployment.
Jerome and Bureau of Labor Statis-
tic8.
Index number ofwholesaleprices,
Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Bank clearings outside New York City.
Anthracite coal production or ship-
ments



















































Dec. '00—Apr. '01 and
Feb. '10—Dec. '11
March '00—June '01,





•The cyclical decline in the business cycle of 1924—1927 is less than the smallest cyclical decline
in any prewar cycle covered by the record.A REVIEW 901
The figures presented in Table 12 express most accurately the differ-
ence in amplitude between the latest cycle and its predecessors; but a
graphic presentation may be added.The charts which follow cover only
the most significant series in our sample.They differ from Table 12
in two ways.(1) The cyclical turning dates used in making the charts
are those given in Table 11 for cycles in general business, whereas the
turning points used in making the tables are those found in each
One purpose of this shift is to show that the cyclical pattern is not rubbed
out of business changes by stretching all the different series analyzed
upon a common time scale, regardless of the dates at which they reached
their several peaks and troughs.Of course, the apparent amplitudes
of the swings are reduced by this method of presentation, for the lowest
and highest points in no series coincide precisely with our reference dates
for revival and recession.But, though flattened somewhat in every
case, the cyclical pattern remains clear.(2) Instead of presenting only
the lowest and highest points of a cycle, the charts show also the progress
of expansion from the trough to the peak, and of contraction from the
peak to the trough.The interval between a revival and the next reces-
sion is divided into three parts as nearly equal as may be, and an average
of the relatives is made for each third.The interval between the reces-
sion and the next revival is subdivided in the same way.Thus the
cyclical behavior of a series is represented in each cycle by eight observa-
tions—its average standing in the three months centering on the revival
date, its average standing in successive thirds of the phase of expansion,
its average standing in the three months centering on the recession date,
and its average standing in successive thirds of the phase of contraction.
A. ninth observation, the average standing in the three months centering
on the next revival, is added to show how cycles link into their successors.
These charts confirm pictorially the mildness of the latest cycle in
comparison with prewar averages.In some cases, however, rather
close scrutiny is necessary to establish the difference.Of course the
tables offer more precise èomparisons, and when one is interested in the
movements of any single series, the use of its own highest and lowest
points is the proper procedure.But the charts make plainer than the
tables the prevalence of a cyclical pattern in business changes, as well
as the in this pattern from one type of transactions to another.
For example, the contrast between the conforming cycles of imports and
the nonconforming cycles of exports stands out clearly.So also does
the relation between the pattern for number of shares sold on the Stock
Exchange and the pattern for New York clearings.But charts speak
well enough for themselves.
While the evidence which has been presented in this rather technical
section is not exhaustive, it covers such a variety of economic factors,
and such important ones, as to justify a conclusion.Business cycles902 RECENT ECONOMIC CHANGES
AVERAGE BEHAVIOR OF VARIOUS ECONOMIC SERIES DURING PREWAR BUSINESS
CYCLES AND THEIR BEHAVIOR DURING THE CYcLE 1924—1927
Thecurves connect averages of relatives (based upon the average value of the series charted in each
cycle) during nine stages of the cycles in general business marked off by the standard set of reference
dates shown in Table 11,These stages are as follows: 3 months centered on the reference date for
revival; successive thirds of the period of expansion; 3 months centered on the reference dates for reces-
sion; successive thirds of the period of contraction, and 3 months centered on the reference date for the
next revival.The upper time scales show the average intervals from the center of one of these stages
to the next during prewar cycles.The lower time scale shows the corresponding intervals in the cycle
of
'CHART7.—INDEX OF GENERAL BUSINESS ACTIVITY, AMERICAN TELE-
PHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY.
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TIME SCALEJ 19Z4-Z7 CYCLE
CHART 10.—WHOLESALE PRICES, ALL COMMODITIES,
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have not been "ironed out" in the United States.But to the recent
economic changes described in the preceding chapters we may add
another accomplishment: the amplitude of cyclical fluctuations has been
reduced.This reduction dates only from 1924, but it extends beyond
1927.With the significant exception of stock-market dealings and
closely related processes, the latest statistics indicate that the expansion
which began in January, 1928, was proceeding at a temperate pace when
this report went to press in March, 1929.Of course, that is no proof that
moderation will characterize the later stages of the current cycle or, its
successors.For we can ascribe mildness of recent fluctuations only
in part to intelligent management.Every factor which has restrained
prosperity has had its share in preventing the development of an
unhealthy boom, and so in guarding against a violent relapse.If and
when Europe regains its prewar level of prosperity, world prices rise,
and American agriculture works out of its troubles, then our skill in
controlling business cycles will be put to a severer test.
IX. HOW STAND IN THE SPRING OF 1929
Foreèasting the future is no part of the present task.But we should
not close the record without noting that recent developments may appear
less satisfactory in retrospect than they appear at present.
Even on the face of affairs, all is not well.Americans have seen more
uniformly fortunate times: for example, in 1906, when the Secretary of
the Treasury was praying that the country might be delivered from more
prosperity.The condition of agriculture, the volume of unemployment,
the textile trades, coal mining, the leather industries, present grave
problems not only to the people immediately concerned, but also to their
fellow citizens.How rapidly these conditions will mend, we do not
know.Some may grow worse.
Nor can we be sure that the industries now prosperous will prolong
indefinitely their recent record of stability.That we have not had a
serious crisis since 1920 or a severe depression since 1921 is no guarantee
that we shall be equally prudent, skillful and fortunate in the years.to
come.If we are to maintain business prosperity, we must continue to
ear.n it month after month and year after year by intelligent effort.The
incomes disbursed to consumers, and to wage earners in particular, must
be increased on a scale sufficient to pay for the swelling volume of con-
sumers' goods sent to market.The credit structure must be kept in
due adjustment to the earnings of business enterprises.Security price
must not outrun prospective profits capitalized at the going rate of inter-
est.Commodity stocks must be held in line with current sales.Over-
commitments of all sorts must be avoided.The building of new industrial
equipment must not be overrapid.These and the similar matters which
might be mentioned present delicate problems of management which910 RECENT ECONOMIC CHANGES
will find their practical solutions in the daily decisions of business cxecu-
t,ives.Perhaps errors are being kept within the limits of tolerance.
l'erhaps no serious setback will occur for years to come.But we are
leaving 192:1 well behind us, and there are signs that the caution inspired
by that disastrous year is wearing thin.
Whether the recent rate of progress in the arts of industry and business
can be maintained is another uncertainty.Past experience, as summed
up in the introductory chapter, suggests that the pace will slacken pres-
ently, and that years may pass before we see such another well-main-
tained advance.But that is a matter in which experience is not a
trustworthy guide.Scientific research, industrial invention and busi-
ness pioneeringalllead into the unknown.They are fascinating
ventures which energetic minds will ever be trying, whether the tang-
ible rewards prove great or small.All that is certain is that whatever
progress in efficiency we continue to make must be won by the same
type of bold and intelligent work that has earned our recent successes.